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My dissertation analyzes two important factors in organ transplantation, transplant center 
performance and organ donation.  The two chapters contribute to the economics literature on 
organizational learning-by-doing and on the effect of legal interventions on pro-social behavior, 
respectively.  Organ transplantation is subject to significant regulation and understanding factors 
affecting survival outcomes and the constrained supply of organs has potentially life-saving 
policy implications within organ transplantation and in other areas of healthcare as well. 
In the first chapter, I question whether liver transplant centers learn by doing and ask 
what factors affect the magnitude of organizational learning-by-doing.  Organizational learning-
by-doing implies that production outcomes improve with increases in cumulative volume 
produced. Empirical research documents the existence of organizational learning-by-doing, 
primarily in manufacturing, but provides little insight into why some firms learn while others do 
not. Using patient-level data on 120 new liver transplant centers, I first establish that 
organizational learning-by-doing exists, but only shortly after entry. Second, I show that 
significant variation in organizational learning-by-doing exists across centers. Third, I test 
whether the timing of entry and pre-entry experience transplanting other organs affect the 
existence and magnitude of organizational learning-by-doing. I find that organizational learning-
by-doing only exists early in the sample period when liver transplantation was a relatively 




outcomes and cumulative volume, with survival benefits from pre-entry experience in lung and 
pancreas transplantation. My results indicate that current policies discouraging entry into liver 
transplantation may reduce access without improving outcomes.  
The second chapter of my dissertation is co-authored with Nicola Lacetera and Mario 
Macis and considers whether laws intended to increase organ and bone marrow donation have 
any effect on increasing donation, which may determine whether a patient receives a potentially 
life-saving transplant or dies waiting.  Many U.S. states passed legislation providing leave to 
organ and bone marrow donors and/or tax benefits for live and deceased organ and bone marrow 
donations and to employers of donors. We exploit cross-state variation in the timing and passage 
of such legislation to analyze its impact on organ donations by living and deceased persons, on 
measures of the quality of the organs transplanted, and on the number of bone marrow donations. 
We find that these provisions did not have a statistically significant impact on the quantity of 
organs donated. The leave legislation, however, did have a positive impact on bone marrow 
donations. We also find some evidence of a positive impact on post-transplant survival rates. Our 
results suggest that this legislation works for moderately invasive procedures such as bone 
marrow donation, but may be too low for organ donation, which is riskier and more burdensome 






Evidence from Liver Transplantation 
 
1. Introduction 
Organizational learning-by-doing occurs because the trials and errors inherent in 
implementing a new production process lead to organizational responses that improve production 
outcomes. Although individual learning-by-doing can contribute to organizational learning-by-
doing, the latter arises independently as well, through improved coordination and management of 
production and the development of interdependent knowledge among production team members 
(Bahk and Gort, 1993; Thompson, 2012).
1
 The presence of organizational learning-by-doing is 
well-documented in manufacturing, although in healthcare the literature has found little evidence 
of any effect of organizational experience on patient outcomes. The literature in general is silent 
on the existence, magnitude, and sources of heterogeneity in learning-by-doing among firms in 
the same industry.  
I contribute to the literature by using detailed, patient-level data on 120 new liver 
transplant centers to answer three questions.
 
First, I ask whether liver transplant centers learn by 
doing and whether any learning-by-doing that does occur is concentrated shortly after entry. 
Second, I test whether heterogeneity in learning-by-doing exists among centers. Third, I analyze 
how the timing of entry between 1987 and 2009 and pre-entry experience transplanting other 
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types of organs influence the existence and magnitude of learning-by-doing. Both factors are 
hypothesized to affect learning-by-doing by diminishing the amount of knowledge that must be 
acquired through learning-by-doing rather than through commonly available knowledge or 
transferable experience from performing other types of transplants. 
Liver transplantation is particularly suited to the study of organizational learning-by-
doing. The transplantation process involves a large number of distinct tasks, and at least through 
the mid-1990’s, significant ambiguity existed about the optimal approach for maximizing 
survival, especially with regard to immunosuppression. In addition, the transplantation process 
extends from pre-operative care to long-term immunosuppression in a necessarily team-based 
environment due to the broad range of skills required for a successful transplant. Hospitals also 
must have or acquire an extensive range of specialized expertise and resources to gain access to 
the only source of cadaveric organs in the United States, the Organ Procurement and 
Transplantation Network.
2
 (Since 2008, the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network 




Determining the existence and extent of learning-by-doing in liver transplantation matters 
for the transplant community, policymakers, and insurers. If learning-by-doing does exist, then 
the decreased probability of survival for patients at new centers should be weighed against the 
survival benefits of increased access to transplantation from those entrants. Even as late as 2011, 
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 The requirements to operate a liver transplant program include a primary liver transplant surgeon and a liver 
transplant physician on staff 365 days a year, 24 hours a day; collaborative involvement with experts from 
radiology, infectious disease, pathology, immunology, anesthesiology, physical therapy, histocompatiblity, 
immunogenetics, and hepatology; access to sophisticated microbiology, clinical chemistry, histocompatibility 
testing, and radiology services; facilities required for monitoring immunosuppressive drugs; extensive blood bank 
support; a clinical transplant pharmacist; and mental health and social support services (The Organ Procurement and 
Transplantation Network, 2009.) 
3





only 132 liver transplant centers existed in the United States, and 14 states had no center at all. 
Alternatively, if learning-by-doing does not exist, then public and insurer policies limiting entry 
into transplantation could lead to unnecessary deaths by limiting access to transplantation. 
Certificate-of-need laws and preferred provider networks are examples of common consolidation 
policies that create barriers to entry for new centers.
4
  
This paper is also important from a research perspective; little is known about 
organizational learning-by-doing in healthcare and about heterogeneity among firms in learning-
by-doing more generally. Many empirical papers in economics do document the importance of 
organizational learning-by-doing for reducing unit costs across a wide range of industries, 
particularly in manufacturing (e.g., Zimmerman, 1982; Irwin and Klenow, 1994; and Benkard, 
2000). A recent paper by Levitt, List, and Syverson (2012) finds a learning-by-doing effect on 
the quality of production (the number of production defects), but the literature in healthcare 
rarely finds evidence of organizational learning-by-doing on the quality of patient outcomes.  
Furthermore, although studies in manufacturing suggest most learning-by-doing occurs 
shortly after entry, only one study in healthcare analyzes organizational learning-by-doing from 
entry (Pisano, Bohmer, and Edmondson, 2001.) Other papers studying organizational learning-
by-doing in healthcare regress patient outcomes on procedure volume accrued since data 
collection began or on lagged annual volume measures, rather than on procedure volume accrued 
since a hospital started offering the studied procedure. Apart from Pisano, Bohmer, and 
Edmondson (2001), the literature in healthcare does not find evidence of organizational learning-
by-doing; only a contemporaneous scale effect appears to exist (e.g., Ho, 2002; Gaynor, Seider, 
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 Twenty-one states have certificate-of-need laws for organ transplantation (National Coalition of State Legislators, 
2011.) These laws require state-level approval to open a new transplant center. Most insurers limit coverage to care 
provided by a specific set of insurer-designated hospitals with inclusion determined in part by minimum volume 
requirements. Minimum volume criteria, which vary by insurer from 10 per year (Medicare) to 40 per year (Aetna), 




and Vogt, 2005). Pisano, Bohmer and Edmondson (2001) contribute to the literature on 
organizational learning-by-doing more generally by showing that the magnitude of learning-by-
doing differs among the sixteen hospitals in their sample.  
Although a large number of papers (outside of healthcare) study learning-by-doing, little 
has been documented about the mechanisms through which organizational learning-by-doing 
occurs. Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995) develop and test a theoretical model predicting that the 
following attributes of the underlying production process determine the existence and magnitude 
of learning-by-doing: the number of tasks involved, the noisiness of the outcome measure, and 
the uncertainty about the optimal way to produce a desired outcome. Balasubramanian and 
Lieberman (2010) support the relationship between these factors and learning-by-doing at the 
industry level in an analysis of 55,000 new manufacturing plants. If these predictions and 
empirical results are generalizable, then liver transplantation should be precisely the type of 
“production” that should exhibit learning-by-doing.  
Using data on liver transplants also overcomes two primary data limitations faced by 
other studies on learning-by-doing in healthcare: a lack of patient-level data since entry into a 
type of procedure and inadequate risk adjustment variables. With patient-level data for 120 liver 
transplant centers since entry, volume-based experience can be accurately measured from entry 
up to the date of a specific patient’s transplant. The breadth of variables on donor and match 
quality and patient health allow me to minimize the possibility of endogeneity arising from 
missing variables for patient, donor and match characteristics that are correlated with both 
experience and survival, e.g., more experienced centers might attract sicker patients, who have 
worse survival outcomes. With 22 years of data, I am able to study the changing role of 




with six-month survival rates below 70% in 1987, to mainstream, with six-month survival rates 
over 90% in 2009.  
My results show that organizational learning-by-doing in liver transplantation does exist, 
but only when centers are relatively inexperienced. Institutional factors and a rich set of patient, 
donor and match characteristics ensure that the effect is not due to endogeneity in the 
relationship between patient survival post-transplant and the cumulative number of liver 
transplants performed. It also does not arise merely with the passage of time; improvements in 
survival are linked directly to volume-based experience. However, learning-by-doing does not 
always occur. Some centers improve from a low initial survival rate, while others start with and 
maintain high survival rates. I empirically identify two factors influencing heterogeneity in 
learning-by-doing among centers. First, I show that the negative effect on survival of receiving a 
transplant at an inexperienced center disappears as liver transplantation becomes a mainstream 
procedure. Second, pre-entry experience matters; centers performing lung transplants prior to 
starting their liver programs have better outcomes while they ramp up their liver programs, and 
prior to 1994, pancreas experience is beneficial for survival outcomes. The fact that the existence 
and magnitude of learning-by-doing varies widely among centers and over time suggests that 
policies relying on experience as a predictor of high quality outcomes might unnecessarily 
restrict access to transplantation.  
The next section, Section 2, gives a brief institutional overview of how patients obtain 
transplants and how organs are allocated, and describes the data. Section 3 answers the question, 
“Do transplant centers learn by doing?,” and confirms that the effect is not driven by the time 
since a center first started performing liver transplants. Section 4 tests for heterogeneity in the 




experience transplanting other organs influence the overall magnitude of learning-by-doing and 
contribute to explaining the variation in early survival outcomes among centers. Section 5 
concludes, highlighting policy implications.  
 
2. Institutional framework and data 
With end-stage liver disease, only a liver transplant can save the patient’s life. After 
diagnosis, a patient’s doctor refers the patient for transplantation. Usually, patients must choose a 
transplant center within their insurer’s preferred provider network.
5
 The decision to waitlist a 
patient lies with each transplant center. Criteria include the ability to pay for the transplant and 
long-term immunosuppression, proof that the patient can arrive at the hospital within the limited 
number of hours in which a liver can be used for transplant, and no physical or psychological 
contraindications. Once on the waitlist, the patient must undergo frequent testing to maintain his 
or her priority status. The patient then waits to be matched with a donated organ.
6
  
For reference, the data I use in this study indicate that the average transplant recipient is a 
47-year-old white male who has spent 221 days on the waitlist before receiving his transplant 
and is not hospitalized prior to arriving at the hospital for transplantation. The most common 
diagnosis is cirrhosis, with Hepatitis C and alcohol use the most common causes of cirrhosis in 
the transplant population. (Hepatitis C- and alcohol-related cirrhosis account for 22% of all 
primary diagnoses in patients receiving transplants.)      
                                                          
5
 With the University of Michigan’s graduate student insurance coverage, I can only obtain a covered liver 
transplant at the University of Michigan Transplant Center, even though two other hospitals in the area, Henry Ford 
and William Beaumont, also perform liver transplants. 
6
 Although most patients are waitlisted at some point during the transplant process, living donors can direct their 
donation to an individual patient, allowing that patient to opt out of the cadaveric donor waitlist. About 4% of 
transplants in the data used live donors, with the first successful live donor liver transplant performed on November 
27, 1989. Directed cadaveric donation is possible, but is not tracked in the data and rarely occurs according to 




Cadaveric organ donation occurs exclusively through the Organ Procurement and 
Transplantation Network, created by Congress with the National Organ Transplant Act in 1984 
and operated ever since by the United Network for Organ Sharing, a nonprofit contractor. Since 
2008, the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network has had authority over live organ 
donation as well. The Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network consists of 58 local 
Organ Procurement Organizations, which each oversee a single exclusive Donation Service 
Area, containing between one and nine transplant centers. These Donation Service Areas are 
aggregated into 11 regions. Figure 1 shows a map of the donation service areas outlined in black 
and the regions differentiated by color.  
When a hospitalized patient dies or death is imminent, the hospital must notify the local 
Organ Procurement Organization, as required by law since 1998. Personnel from the Organ 
Procurement Organization contact the family of the patient to obtain consent, unless donation 
already was authorized. If consent is given, then the United Network for Organ Sharing follows 
the liver allocation algorithm to determine the best matches for the organ, based on medical 
criteria such as blood type, organ size, and disease severity. Time on the waitlist serves as a tie-
breaker. In general, livers are first allocated within a Donation Service Area, before being 
offered regionally, and then nationally. Sixty-eight percent of organs are allocated within the 
Donation Service Area, 24% are allocated at the regional level, and 7% are allocated nationally. 
According to the data used in this study, the average donor is a 36-year-old deceased white male. 
The most common cause of death is head trauma resulting from a motor vehicle accident.  
I obtained the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network data directly from the 




all liver transplants performed in the United States since October 1, 1987.
7
 Data with hospital-
level identifiers require a formal proposal and signed confidentiality agreement before the United 
Network for Organ Sharing will release the data. Pursuant to that agreement, I am not allowed to 
identify any individual patients or centers. Based on the actual reported transplant dates, the data 
panel ranges from September 30, 1987, through December 31, 2009, and includes a total of 
101,543 liver transplants.  
Although the period from September 30, 1987, to December 31, 2009, captures the vast 
majority of liver transplants, 35 of the 155 centers in the data performed transplants prior to 
September 30, 1987 (Terasaki, 1986). Based on news archives, only three centers performed 
liver transplants prior to 1983 in the U.S., so most missing volume information comes from 
shortly prior to the inception of my panel.
8
 Although the first successful liver transplant was 
performed in 1967, only 15 procedures were performed in 1980. By 1986, the annual number of 
liver transplants had increased to 924. In total, around 3,000 liver transplants performed between 
1980 and 1987 are not included in the 101,543 transplants documented by the Organ 
Procurement and Transplantation Network between 9/30/1987 and 12/31/2009 (Evans, 1991). 
Although the amount and duration of pre-panel data are limited, the theoretical literature 
on learning-by-doing (dating back to Arrow in 1962), the empirical literature from 
manufacturing, and the raw data all suggest that most learning-by-doing occurs quite soon after a 
center enters. Therefore, I include in my analysis only those centers beginning transplantation 
after September 30, 1987.
9
 These 120 centers performed 64,315 transplants or 64% of all 
                                                          
7
 The United Network for Organ Sharing website states October 1, 1987, but the reported transplant dates in the data 
start on September 30, 1987. 
8
 I found documentation of only two transplant teams performing transplants prior to 1983. One team, headed by 
transplant pioneer Thomas Starzl, performed transplants at the University of Colorado – Denver before the program 
moved to the University of Pittsburgh. The other team operated out of the University of Minnesota. 
9
To briefly describe the differences between incumbent centers and centers entering during the panel period: the 




transplants between September 30, 1987 and December 31, 2009. Of these, I drop 4,792 patients 
who were lost during the follow-up period, making it impossible to measure accurately their total 
survival time.
10
 In the regressions controlling for patient, donor, and match characteristics, I lose 
additional observations due to non-reporting of these variables. (I report the number of 
observations in all the regression tables and use all 64,315 observations to measure cumulative 
volume.) Three transplant centers, accounting for 51 of the 4,792 dropped patient observations, 
are not included in the regression analysis due to non-reporting of covariates.  
 
3. Do liver transplant centers learn by doing? 
3.1 Existence of learning-by-doing 
Both theory and empirical evidence indicate that learning-by-doing is subject to 
diminishing returns, and in many cases, those returns diminish quickly to zero, at which point 
terminal productivity has been reached (e.g., Arrow, 1962; Zimmerman, 1982; Thornton and 
Thompson, 2001; Levitt, List and Syverson, 2012; Thompson, 2012). This implies that learning-
by-doing should be most prevalent shortly after a hospital starts offering liver transplants. 
Suggestive evidence exists from an early paper in heart transplantation, which compares the 
mean survival outcomes of the first five transplants at a center with those thereafter and finds 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
daily census of 536 versus 494), and are more likely to be government owned (34% versus 28%) and less likely to 
be privately owned (0% versus 3%). The mean year of entry and average survival rates for incumbents versus 
entrants are 1983 and 1990 and 85% and 88%, respectively.  
10
 I perform a robustness check to verify that the patients lost to follow-up are not biasing my results. The Organ 
Procurement and Transplantation Network data include dates of death from the Social Security Death Master File. I 
use the dates of death in the Social Security Death Master File data to impute the survival time for patients lost to 
follow-up. Including these observations increases the survival penalty from being within transplants 0 to 10 by 0.24 
percentage points or 6.8% and decreases the penalty of being within transplants 11 to 20 by 0.82 percentage points 
or 25.9% (in the full model with center and year fixed effects and patient, donor, and match characteristics). The 
website for the Social Security Death Master File (www.ssdmf.com) specifically states that “the absence of a 
particular person is not proof that this person is alive” and the data have been shown to omit individuals, especially 
those dying at younger ages. I choose not to include these observations because I cannot confirm the validity of the 
Social Security Death Master File data, which seem to be missing non-randomly. Patients appear to be lost to 
follow-up essentially at random based on regressions of the probability of being lost to follow-up on patient 




that the first five had worse survival outcomes, using data on centers entering between 1984 and 
1986 (Laffel et al., 1992). 
Two studies in liver transplantation document what appears to be an early learning effect. 
Clavien et al. (1994) analyze the first 215 transplants performed at the University of Toronto and 
find that the last 50 of those transplants had fewer complications than the first 50 transplants. 
Minor complications drive these differences rather than more serious adverse events such as 
retransplantation or death. Oltoff et al. (2005) analyze the survival outcomes of 385 adult-to-
adult living donor liver transplants in 9 centers and find that the first 15 transplants have worse 
outcomes than transplants 31 and above, but that transplants 21 to 30 are better than those above 
31. These studies suggest early learning-by-doing may exist, but are limited by the small number 
of centers, restricted types of patients considered, and identification of the effect through a 
comparison of means across cumulative volume categories. 
My first hypothesis is that liver transplant centers learn by doing and that this learning 
exists only with the initial transplants performed, i.e., that centers quickly reach terminal quality. 
Figure 2 presents evidence consistent with this hypothesis. The scatter plot graphs the 
relationship between the mean survival rate across new centers and cumulative volume. Each 
triangle represents the mean six-month survival rate across the 120 centers for that level of 
cumulative volume. Given the noisiness even in the averaged raw survival rates, I also graph six-
month survival probabilities (predicted using locally weighted regressions) by cumulative 
volume up to 100 transplants.
11
 A clear upward but diminishing trend exists.  
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 I run locally weighted regressions (using Stata’s lowess command) to estimate the probability of six-month 
survival post-transplant as a function of cumulative volume up to 100 transplants, using a bandwidth of 0.8, i.e., 
80% of the data. I then graph the predicted six-month survival rate by cumulative volume up to 100 transplants, 
using only the first 100 transplants to focus on the period in which most learning-by-doing occurs. Locally weighted 
regression estimates provide a smoother regression function estimate, are more precise at the boundaries, and are 




Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for seven different survival time periods; alive at 
one day post-transplant, alive at one week, alive at one month, alive at three months, alive at six 
months, alive at one year, and alive at three years. The table reports how survival outcomes 
change with cumulative volume by relating the survival outcome to cumulative volume for the 
following groups of patients: 0 to 10, 11 to 20, 21 to 30, and 31 to 40, and also includes a fifth 
column for transplants 81 to 100 to check whether the raw data indicates that learning-by-doing 
is isolated in the initial transplants performed by a center. Especially for the survival periods 
exceeding one day, the numbers in the first two columns are similar, as are the numbers in 
Columns [3] to [5]. A noticeable jump exists between Columns [2] and [3], however, suggesting 
that a shift in the importance of learning-by-doing occurs somewhere around the 21
st
 transplant. 
(This break around the 21
st
 transplant also appears in the regression results that follow.) The last 
column shows the p-value for a one sided t-test of the hypothesis that transplants 0 to 20 have an 
equal or higher survival rate than transplants 81 to 100. In all cases, the p-value is equal to zero, 
indicating that the outcomes of early patients are statistically significantly worse than those of 
later patients.  
Although suggestive, the graph and descriptive statistics do not control for time-invariant 
center characteristics, factors affecting all centers in a given time period, and patient, donor and 
match characteristics. Table 2 details patient, donor, and match characteristics included in the 
regressions and shows that many of the means of these variables differ between the first 21 




 transplants performed. On the one hand, it appears that early 
patients might be sicker – they are more likely to have a life expectancy of less than seven days 
(Status 1), be in an intensive care unit, or be on life support at the time of transplant. On the other 




donor, and match characteristics in the regressions that follow. Also associated with improved 
survival rates, early patients are younger and have shorter wait times, younger donors, fewer 
African-American donors, and fewer blood type incompatibilities with the donor organs. At the 
same time, the distance a donor organ must travel to reach the recipient is larger for early 
transplant recipients and negatively associated with survival.  
In the regressions that follow, I focus specifically on early learning, i.e. the within center 
change in survival outcomes as cumulative volume increases. Given that the only clear and 
consistent evidence of learning occurs within the first transplants performed, I use the following 
linear probability model to assess whether improvements in survival come from learning or if 





                                                                         
            
 
 
The dependent variable, Alive at six monthsiht, equals one if patient i treated at hospital h 
at time t survives at least six months and equals zero otherwise. I use six-month survival in order 
to capture the multiple aspects of the transplant process from surgery through maintenance 
immunosuppression. For the longer time periods, the effects of learning-by-doing on survival 
outcomes are less accurately measured due to the influence on survival of other factors 
exogenous to transplantation and the difficulty in tracking patients as long as three years after 
surgery. Because the relationship between CumulativeVolumeiht and survival in the raw data does 
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 Logit results, reported in Table 4, tell the same early learning story, so I use the linear probability model for ease 
of exposition and to avoid unnecessary complexity in estimation (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). In addition, given that 
many of the independent variables are dichotomous, the partial effects from these variables are constant and a key 
benefit of the logit and probit models, allowing the partial effects to vary with the values of the independent 





not follow an obvious functional form and the empirical results in manufacturing suggest that 
organizational learning-by-doing is a short-lived phenomenon, I tested a variety of categories of 
cumulative volume to tease out when learning-by-doing occurs. These ranged from individual 
dummy variables for each transplant below a variety of thresholds to extending the categories up 
to 500 transplants. CaseMixiht is a vector of controls for patient, donor, and match characteristics 
that previously have been established by the literature on liver transplantation as important for 
post-transplant survival (Edwards et al., 1999; Axelrod et al., 2004; Freeman et al., 2008).
13
 Also 
included are center fixed effects, γh, to control for time-invariant, center-specific factors and year 
fixed effects, τt , to control for factors affecting all centers in a given year. I cluster standard 
errors at the center level to control for heteroskedasticity and spatial correlation among patients 
receiving transplants at a given center.  
Equation (1) parallels to some extent the empirical specifications commonly used in the 
manufacturing literature to study organizational learning-by-doing. In general, those papers use a 
log-linearized Cobb-Douglas production function as the estimating equation (e.g., 
Balasubramanian and Lieberman, 2010; Levitt, List, and Syverson, 2013). The specification I 
use approximates a production function with hospital and industry experience, case mix, and 
time-invariant hospital-specific factors as inputs in the production of patient survival. Hospital 
experience I measure using cumulative volume since entry, overall changes in industry 
experience and technology and regulatory shocks are captured by the year fixed effects, case mix 
includes donor, patient and match characteristics associated with patient survival, and I include 
the center fixed effects in order to capture time-invariant hospital characteristics, which might 
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affect survival. Examples of such characteristics include hiring a particularly accomplished liver 
transplant surgeon to lead the new center, attempting to start up multiple types of transplants 
centers at the same time, or transplanting other organs prior to beginning liver transplantation, 
which I discuss in Section 4.2b. Given the dichotomous nature of most of the variables included 
in the regression, simply using a log-linearized Cobb-Douglas production function is not 
feasible. Therefore, I use the above-described specification to capture the relationships among 
the variables. The separate cumulative volume categories also fit the data better than using the 
natural log of cumulative volume. 
Table 3 provides the main regression results exploring the relationship between 
cumulative volume and survival probabilities. I group transplants below 50 into the cumulative 
volume categories of 0 to 10, 11 to 20, 21 to 30, 31 to 40, and 41 to 50, with the reported effects 
relative to being the 51
st
 or above transplant recipient at a center.
14
 Column [1] shows clear 
evidence of a learning curve through all five categories. The importance of the effect generally 
diminishes with increasing volumes and is consistently negative and significant. Given that I am 
analyzing learning-by-doing or the within center effect of a change in cumulative volume on 
survival, I add center fixed effects in Column [2] to account for time-invariant factors specific to 
a center that might influence survival outcomes. This allows me to compare how survival 
outcomes change with cumulative experience within an individual transplant center. The 
evidence for organizational learning-by-doing becomes even stronger with the inclusion of the 
center fixed effects, although the center fixed effects contribute surprisingly little to explaining 
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 I can group the transplants by as few as three and still identify a learning effect that loses significance around 20 
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the variation in the outcome variables. The coefficients on the cumulative volume variables 
imply that an additional four patients die within six months during the first 51 transplants 
performed by a center relative to 51 transplants performed later in a center’s history.   
Because important changes in immunosuppression, regulation and insurance coverage 
occurred in liver transplantation between 1987 and 2009, I include year fixed effects to account 
for these institutional changes and to capture the overall increase in patient survival that has 
occurred over time. (Average survival rates increase by 24 percentage points between 1987 and 
2009.)  Including year fixed effects could lead to conservative estimates of organizational 
learning because cumulative volume increases over time. However, because the effects of 
changes in immunosuppression, regulation and insurance coverage affected all centers 
essentially simultaneously, the inclusion of year fixed effects is appropriate, even at the expense 
of possibly underestimating the full learning-by-doing effect.  Indeed, the inclusion of year fixed 
effects in Column [3] reduces the size of the coefficients by more than 60% and renders the 
coefficient on cumulative volume less than or equal to 10 statistically insignificant.  The R-
squared increases by about 40% with the inclusion of the year fixed effects. The large effect on 
the coefficients from including the year fixed effects suggests that the importance of 
organizational learning-by-doing may have changed over time, even though on average only a 
small amount of learning-by-doing exists. (This possibility will be explored further in Section 
4.2a, which analyzes the importance of the timing of entry for learning-by-doing.) 
In addition to the effect of secular changes in survival affecting all transplant centers, 
new centers might face disproportionately lower quality organs, worse matches, and sicker 
patients than they do later on, which means that what appears to be a learning curve might 




characteristics, in [5] match characteristics and in [6] recipient characteristics. (The number of 
observations falls by six with the inclusion of donor characteristics, by 728 with the inclusion of 
recipient characteristics, and by 6,854 with the inclusion of match characteristics, primarily due 
to the inclusion of cold ischemia time, the time after an organ is recovered and cooled and before 
it is transplanted.
15
)  It does not appear that patient, donor, and match characteristics are driving 
the negative coefficients on cumulative volume less than or equal to 10 and cumulative volume 
between 11 and 20.   
The coefficients in Column [6] of Table 3 imply that 0.67 additional patients die in the 
first six months during a center’s first 51 transplants relative to its later transplants. If I compare 
the coefficients on the experience variables with those on the control variables in Column [6], the 
only patient characteristics leading to a greater decrease in survival (in percentage points) than 
being within the first 11 transplants include having had a previous transplant (-10.86), being on 
life support at the time of transplant (-12.53), and being in the intensive care unit (-7.26) or 
hospitalized outside of intensive care (-4.85) relative to those patients not hospitalized prior to 
transplantation. None of the donor or match characteristics have as large an impact on patient 
survival as being within the first 11 transplants performed at a center. 
These results do not hinge on the use of a six-month post-transplant survival period. 
Relative to the six-month survival results, shorter survival periods have smaller coefficients on 
the cumulative volume variables, while longer survival periods have larger coefficients. In the 
full model with center and year fixed effects, and patient, donor, and match characteristics, the 
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coefficient on cumulative volume less than or equal to 10 ranges from -0.0171 (p < 0.01) for 
one-day survival to -0.0397 (p < 0.05) for three-year survival. 
 
3.2 Endogeneity  
Omitted variables leading to an endogenous relationship between cumulative volume and 
survival that looks like learning-by-doing would occur if some factor positively influenced both 
cumulative volume and survival. For example, a center might attract unobservably sicker patients 
during the first 21 transplants than thereafter. However, the full model used here, including year 
and center fixed effects and patient, donor, and match characteristics, greatly reduces and 
essentially eliminates these possibilities.  
The inclusion of center fixed effects means that endogeneity between individual survival 
outcomes and cumulative volume would have to exist within an individual transplant center, 
which significantly differs in plausibility from a cross-center comparison context. In addition, 
decreasing the potential that apparent learning-by-doing is actually new centers treating 
unobservably worse cases, I include a wide range of donor, match, and patient characteristics. 
The fact that all organizational learning-by-doing is evident only shortly after entry means that 
the omitted variable issue would apply only to the difference between the first 21 transplants and 
those thereafter rather than contributing to a longer term relationship.  It seems more reasonable 
that learning-by-doing would be a short-lived phenomenon, as predicted by theory and evidenced 
in the manufacturing literature, than that omitted variable issues affect the relationship between 
cumulative volume and survival only shortly after entry. 
Apart from the inclusion of center fixed effects and patient, donor, and match 




institutional and medical factors make it unlikely that hospitals select or attract sicker patients 
early on. First of all, hospitals have extensive control over the patients they waitlist and choose to 
transplant. Systematically selecting unobservably sicker patients could lead to a low survival rate 
and possible negative impacts to reputation, particularly for a new center without an established 
track record. Centers also face the possibility of getting flagged by the Organ Procurement and 
Transplantation Network if the observed survival rate falls too far below the expected survival 
rate.  How expected survival is measured by the Organ Procurement and Transplantation 
Network has varied over time, but during the period from 1987 to 2009, the most extensive set of 
risk adjustment variables used in the estimation of expected survival included only age, race, 
gender, and diagnosis (non-cholestatic cirrhosis versus other). In other words, almost all factors 
important for survival are not included in the expected survival rates and thus centers have a 
strong incentive not to select sicker patients for waitlisting along any metric. The possibility that 
centers systematically select sicker patients shortly after entry is not corroborated by discussions 
with transplant surgeons.  If anything, more experienced hospitals are likely to treat sicker 
patients than less experienced centers, making my estimates of learning-by-doing more likely to 
be conservative than overstated.  In addition, the coefficients reported in Table 3 suggest that 
patient, donor, and match characteristics do not have a major impact on the relationship between 
cumulative volume and patient survival. 
Further reducing concerns about reverse causality in particular, neither centers nor 
patients have much control over the timing of transplant.  In other words, it is difficult for a 
center or a patient to affect whether or not that patient will be within the first 20 transplants.  
Each center determines which patients to waitlist, but the waitlist itself is aggregated at the 




organ available, how close a patient is to death without a transplant, and prior to 2002, waitlist 
time. With the scarcity of donor organs and the fact that the liver allocation system prioritizes the 
sickest patients, it seems unlikely that patients or their doctors would turn down a donor organ in 
order to wait for the transplant center to become more experienced.  
 
3.3 Learning by doing or by time in operation 
An additional issue with studying learning-by-doing is that learning may accrue as a 
function of the time a center has been performing liver transplants rather than as a function of 
volume-based experience, but it would still appear that learning was accruing with cumulative 
volume since cumulative volume is correlated with the age of the transplant center. I explore this 
possibility by regressing the probability of six-month survival on the age of the transplant center 
in quarters with the omitted category age greater than one year. Table 6 shows the results with 
the controls included listed below the table. Once I include year fixed effects, the center age 
effects become statistically insignificant. Adding in patient, donor, and match characteristics 
does not materially affect the coefficients, which remain statistically insignificant and small in 
magnitude. When I include the cumulative volume categories, the coefficients on the cumulative 
volume variables that were significant in Table 3 (Column [6]) are larger in absolute size and 
more significant than when I do not control for center age. This is the opposite of what we would 
expect if learning-by-doing accrues over time rather than with volume. (The coefficients on the 
time variables become positive but remain insignificant.) These results suggest that center age 




not proxy for time in operation.
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 Given the general insignificance of the coefficients on the time 
in operation variables, it seems reasonable to conclude that most of the learning that occurs is 
cumulative volume-based rather than that it accrues with existence as a liver transplant center.  
 
4. Heterogeneity in learning-by-doing 
4.1 Existence of heterogeneity in learning-by-doing 
Although the results in Table 3 show evidence of learning-by-doing on average, the effect 
could vary across centers. The literature is largely silent about heterogeneity in the existence and 
magnitude of organizational learning-by-doing across producers in the same industry. Levitt, 
List, and Syverson (2012) do identify variation across teams in an automobile assembly plant 
and Balasubramanian and Lieberman (2010) identify differences across manufacturing 
industries. The only existing paper that econometrically identifies heterogeneity in learning-by-
doing across producers within an industry is Pisano, Bohmer, and Edmondson (2001), which 
finds such heterogeneity using a sample of “high quality” hospitals selected by the manufacturer 
of a new technology for minimally invasive cardiac surgery. With a sample of sixteen hospitals 
and using the quality outcome of procedure time, the paper focuses on the fact that learning-by-
doing differs across hospitals even when they receive identical training and start using the same 
technology at approximately the same time.  
Given the Pisano, Bohmer and Edmondson (2001) results, I explore the possibility that 
not all centers learn or learn as much as other centers, or that other omitted variables could be 
driving what appears to be an early learning effect. To focus on the period during which most 
learning-by-doing occurs and to simplify the analysis that follows, I reduce the six volume 
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categories (0-10; 11-20; 21-30; 31-40; 41-50; 51+) into one dummy variable for whether a 
patient received one of the first 21 transplants performed at a center. As shown in Table 8, this 
does little to affect the explanatory power of the model, and I cannot reject the null that the 
coefficients on the cumulative volume categories over 20 equal zero.  
I use the following specification to explore the existence and magnitude of heterogeneity 
in learning-by-doing among centers:  
 
                                                 
                                                                        
 
The key difference between Equation (2) and Equation (1) is the interaction of the 
dummy variable for cumulative volume between 0 and 20 with the center indicator variables Ih, 
omitting the constant. Adding the coefficient on the interaction term to the main coefficient for 
cumulative volume between 0 and 20 gives estimates of the early learning effect by center. I then 
categorize these centers into those with lower survival rates during their first 21 transplants than 
thereafter and those with higher initial survival rates that perform worse or the same after 
completing their first 21 transplants. In other words, I create two groups of centers based on 
whether the net effect on six-month survival of being within the first 21 transplants is negative or 
if it is positive or neutral at that center.  
Table 9 summarizes the patient-level results from these regressions. Sixty-one centers 
improve while 49 do worse after their first 21 transplants. (Because seven centers included in 
these regressions do not reach 21 transplants, I cannot calculate a center-specific learning penalty 





is -12.16 and for those that get worse or stay the same, it is 8.61 percentage points, both with 
large standard deviations. An F-test of the equality of the coefficients can be rejected with a p-
value of zero. These numbers suggest that heterogeneity does exist across centers.  
The last two columns give information on how the learning process occurs. Those centers 
that improve after performing their first 21 transplants start off with lower initial survival rates 
than those that get worse or stay the same after performing their first 21 transplants. The gap 
narrows from a difference of 18 percentage points for transplants 0 to 20 to a difference of 2 
percentage points for transplants 21 to 40. The centers that improve gain an average of 15 
percentage points, while those that get worse or stay the same only drop by 5 percentage points. 
In general, one would have expected learning to be positive factor; those that learn do better than 
those that do not. These results, however, indicate that those centers that learn do so because they 
start off with low survival rates and improve to the level of centers that enter with and maintain 
high survival rates. From a policy perspective, this means that the first patients at a center do not 
necessarily have lower probabilities of survival and that identifying what determines whether 
centers have higher or lower initial survival rates could save lives. My results also show that 
poor performance early on does not necessarily lead to future poor performance, in contrast to 
Levitt, List, and Syverson (2012), who find the opposite across teams in an automobile assembly 
plant. Specifically, they find that teams with a higher defect rate initially continue to perform 
worse than those teams with better initial performance. Figure 3 shows a histogram of the net 




distributed around zero, noticeable variation in center-specific learning exists. The left tail has 
some notable outliers and the distribution is generally left-skewed.
17
  
The literature on the economics of education often uses Empirical Bayes’ estimation (also 
referred to as shrinkage estimation) to estimate individual teacher-specific effects on student 
outcomes (e.g., Kane and Staiger, 2008; Jacob and Lefgren, 2005). In the context of this paper, 
Empirical Bayes’ estimation might be appropriate because the estimates for the center-specific 
effects could be imprecise due to small sample sizes, and Empirical Bayes’ estimation shrinks 
such estimates toward the average estimated effect of being within the first 21 transplants at a 
center. When I calculate the center-specific learning penalties using Empirical Bayes’ estimation, 
the standard deviation of the center-specific learning effect shrinks from 0.1466 to 0.0932 and 
the average center-specific learning effect increases in magnitude from -0.0291 to     -0.0498. In 
Figure 4, I overlay a histogram of the shrunken effects (in gray) on the histogram depicted in 
Figure 3 (in black). The range of the distribution of effects decreases and also appears even more 
left-skewed than in Figure 3. Although these new estimates suggest less heterogeneity and more 
learning-by-doing, a recent paper by Guarino et al. (2012) documents via simulation analysis that 
Empirical Bayes’ estimators diminish the variance in the estimated effects but at the price of bias 
and inconsistency, especially under non-random assignment of patients to transplant centers, e.g., 
children’s hospitals.  
 
4.2 Sources of heterogeneity 
The main results in Section 3 indicate that the inclusion of year fixed effects had a major 
impact on the size and significance of the coefficients on the cumulative volume variables and 
                                                          
17
 Omitting centers with net effects below the 10
th
 percentile and above the 90
th
 percentile only strengthens the 
results in the regressions that follow; the coefficient on cumulative volume less than or equal to 20 increases in both 




the prior section (4.1) established that organizational learning-by-doing varies across centers. 
Therefore, I now test two hypotheses to further explore those results: centers entering earlier in 
the sample period and centers with less pre-entry experience transplanting other organs will 
exhibit more learning-by-doing. To further illustrate how these differences might arise across 
centers and why these two factors might affect learning-by-doing, I draw on the Bayesian 
learning model developed by Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995). I discuss it in the liver 
transplantation context, in order to provide intuition for how the timing of entry and pre-entry 
experience transplanting other types of organs could affect the learning process.  
The learning-by-doing process arises in the Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995) model because 
the “decisionmaker”, i.e., the transplant center, must make decisions based on incomplete 
information regarding what the optimal decision would be. Decisions could involve staffing, the 
timing of surgery, or post-transplant dosing of immunosuppressants. After the transplantation 
process concludes, the transplant center receives a signal regarding how close to optimal its 
decision (or decisions) was and updates its expectation of the optimal decision for the next 
transplant based on the new information gained from the signal. The signal received by the 
decisionmaker does not clearly indicate what the optimal decision would have been due to noise 
in the signal that arises from transitory disturbances such as having a transplant team member 
unexpectedly absent on the day of transplantation. With each subsequent transplant, the 
transplant center continues updating its expectation of the optimal approach and its decisions 
increasingly approximate the ideal decision. The model predicts that the amount of learning-by-
doing that occurs will depend on uncertainty about the optimal approach for a given transplant, 
the noisiness of the signal received after a transplant has been completed, and the number of 




The two hypotheses I test in this section can be related back to this model. The timing of 
entry affects the magnitude of learning-by-doing due to changes in the amount of knowledge 
available to all centers and thus the associated center-specific uncertainty about the optimal 
approach. In other words, later in the panel period decisions will more closely approximate the 
ideal decision because they will be better educated guesses due to common knowledge regarding 
liver transplantation that will have been disseminated through research publications, conferences, 
increasingly specialized training programs, and even the expansion in access to the Internet 
during this time period. These factors along with transplant-specific technology innovations, 
such as new and better immunosuppressants and organ allocation algorithms, all act to decrease 
the uncertainty about the optimal approach by standardizing and simplifying liver 
transplantation.  
The second factor I hypothesize affects learning-by-doing is pre-entry experience 
transplanting other types of organs. Hospital-specific general knowledge of transplantation could 
improve both initial decisions as well as the amount of knowledge gained from the difference 
between the post-transplant signal and the decision made. In other words, going through this 
Bayesian learning process for other types of organs transplanted might lead to an increased 
understanding of transplantation and its associated learning process in general and thus to better 
decisions initially and as the learning process proceeds.  
 
4.2a Timing of entry 
The first heterogeneity hypothesis I test is whether the amount of learning-by-doing 
decreases as liver transplantation transitions from experimental to mainstream medicine. In order 




Technological innovations and institutional changes occurring in liver transplantation define 
these two periods. To summarize briefly, the FDA approved two new immunosuppressants, 
tacrolimus and mycophenolate mofetil, in 1994 and 1995, respectively. Tacrolimus is a more 
powerful immunosuppressant than its predecessor, cyclosporine, and mycophenolate mofetil has 
a much better side effect profile than its predecessor, azathioprine (Post et al., 2005). These 
drugs diffused generally across centers at approximately the same rate until both became the 
first-line drugs for immunosuppression. By 2009, 88% of patients received tacrolimus versus 7% 
cyclosporine; for mycophenolate mofetil and azathioprine, the percentages were 74% and 1%.
18
 
Major changes in organ procurement and allocation include new organ allocation algorithms 
introduced in 1996 and 2002, and the legal requirement starting in 1998 that hospitals notify their 
local organ procurement organization of all deaths eligible for donation. Insurers also expanded 
coverage during this period with Medicare extending transplant coverage from a case-by-case 
basis to all Medicare eligible individuals with liver failure other than liver failure caused by 
Hepatitis B or cancer in 1996, to Hepatitis B patients in 1999, and to patients with hepatocellular 
carcinoma in 2001 (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services National Coverage 
Determination, 2006). Based on discussions with personnel at the University of Michigan’s 
Transplant Center, toward the end of the first period and into the second period, training 
certification programs for transplant surgeons and physicians became increasingly specialized. 
This trend continued through the latter part of the second period for other personnel, e.g., 
transplant administrators, transplant coordinators, and transplant nurses. 
Figure 5 replicates the locally weighted regression results depicted graphically in Figure 
2 for the two periods. Although both periods have close to the same survival rate by transplant 
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100, how they get to that survival rate varies. Pre-1994, a clear learning curve appears that 
plateaus around 70 transplants. In the second period between 1994 and 2009, essentially no 
evidence for learning-by-doing exists.  
In Panel A of Table 10, I show the mean and standard deviation by period for three six-
month survival measures: overall, during the first 21 transplants, and during transplants 21 to 40. 
All three survival measures increase between the two periods. The largest increase over time is 
for transplants 0 to 20 with a 16 percentage point increase from the first to the second period. As 
in Figure 5, a learning curve is most clearly evidenced in the early period with a 7 percentage 
point increase between the first 21 transplants and transplants 21 to 40. In the later period, the 
increase is only 2 percentage points. The standard deviations (√ (   )) of the survival 
measures ( ) correspondingly decline over time, and in both periods are greater for the first 21 
transplants than for transplants 21 to 40.  
In Panel B of Table 10, I provide information on the number of centers in the sample for 
each period. Eighty-six new centers enter between 1987 and 1994 and 34 enter between 1994 
and 2009. For the period-level analysis, however, I split the data based on the date of transplant 
rather than the date of entry. In the last row of Table 15, I show how many centers were 
completing their first 21 transplants during each period; 86 and 83, respectively. Patient counts 
are included for each subset of centers.
19
 
I replicate Equation (1) by period, and in Table 11, present the results from these 
regressions. The regressions are run separately by period in order to allow the coefficients on the 
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other independent variables to change over time as well, which they do.
20
 For example, 
improvements in immunosuppression means an incompatible blood type match between donor 
and recipient could matter less for survival than it did before the introduction of the new drugs. 
(For example, an incompatible blood type between patient and donor in the early period is 
associated with a statistically significant three percentage point reduction in six-month survival, 
but in the later period the effect is positive and insignificant.) The prevalence of most patient, 
donor, and match characteristics also changes over time. As shown in Table 13, all the control 
variables differ statistically from each other between the two periods based on a two-sided t-test 
except for the following three recipient characteristics; diagnosis of biliary atresia, being 
African-American, and having a blood type O.  
Essentially all learning-by-doing occurs before 1994.  In the overall sample, 0.67 
additional patients die within six months as a center completes its first 51 transplants than would 
have died during 51 transplants later in that center’s history. The cost of inexperience in Period 1 
is higher; more than 1.25 additional patients die during the first 51 transplants. In Period 2, 
however, no significant evidence of learning-by-doing exists. Although this reduces the number 
of centers completing their first 21 transplants in the last period to only 22, I also split the second 
period into 1994 to 2002 and 2003 to 2009, and find no evidence of learning-by-doing in either 
period, as shown in Table 12.   
Determining the relationship between how experimental a procedure is and the 
importance of learning-by-doing is difficult with only one type of procedure. I am, however, able 
to offer suggestive evidence by reporting the relationship between six-month survival 
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significant, indicating survival improvements by period. The main difference is that the overall statistical 
significance of being within the first 21 transplants increases when the coefficients on the control variables are 




probabilities and cumulative volume for the other major types of organs transplanted (kidneys, 
pancreas, hearts, lungs, and intestines.) The first successful organ transplant was a kidney in 
1954. Hearts, livers, and pancreas followed in the late 1960’s. Lungs and intestines were not 
transplanted until 1983 and 1987, respectively. In terms of the total number of transplants 
between January 1, 1988, and December 31, 2009, kidneys were by far the most common with 
300,894 performed. Hearts followed at 48,508. Lungs and pancreases had been transplanted 
20,797 and 23,232 times, respectively. Only 1,884 intestinal transplants had been completed by 
the end of 2009.
 21
 (Livers were transplanted 101,543 times during this period.) 
Figure 6 replicates the locally weighted regression results in Figure 2 for each of the 
other five organs using patient-level data from the United Network for Organ Sharing for 
entrants into each type of organ transplant from 1988 through 2009. For hearts, livers, and 
intestines, I use the six-month patient survival rate. In the case of kidneys and pancreas, I use the 
six-month graft survival rate because if a kidney or pancreas transplant fails, a patient usually 
can return to dialysis. Indeed, how mainstream a procedure is generally seems to be correlated 
with how much of an early learning effect exists. Kidney transplant survival rates do not seem to 
change much with experience and have an average six-month survival rate above 80%. Pancreas 
shows perhaps a surprising amount of learning-by-doing, albeit short-lived, given the relatively 
long history of pancreas transplantation. Most likely this is because pancreas transplantation did 
not become common as quickly as the transplantation of livers and hearts, which were first 
successfully transplanted around the same time. Even today, a much wider range of surgical 
techniques commonly are used in pancreas transplantation relative to the range for other types of 
transplants (Squifflet, Gruessner, and Sutherland, 2008). Heart transplantation shows minimal 
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evidence of learning-by-doing. Lung transplantation does seem to improve with experience, and 
the most experimental type of transplant, intestines, shows the greatest evidence of learning-by-
doing in early transplants. Figure 6 suggests that the liver transplant results are generalizable at 
least within organ transplantation. Given the predictions in Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995), which 
were not intended to be specific to any particular industry, and evidence for those predictions 
across manufacturing industries in Balasubramanian and Lieberman (2010), the reduction in 
organizational learning-by-doing with decreasing uncertainty about the optimal approach is 
likely generalizable outside of organ transplantation as well.  
 
4.2b Pre-entry experience 
In this section, I test the hypothesis that experience transplanting organs prior to starting 
liver transplantation will affect the relationship between cumulative volume and survival 
outcomes. Table 14 reports descriptive statistics for the pre-entry experience variables. For each 
variable in the table, I include the percent and number of patients receiving transplants with that 
characteristic during the first 21 transplants, the number of centers in which those patients are 
transplanted, and the average survival rate among the patients in each category.  
The descriptive statistics in Table 14 show that most patients receive transplants at 
hospitals with kidney transplant programs in operation prior to starting their liver programs. A 
slight majority receive them at hospitals with heart transplant programs prior to their first liver 
transplant. A limited number of patients receive transplants at hospitals with pre-entry 
experience in pancreas and lung transplantation. Note that only one center transplanting lungs 
pre-entry did not also perform heart transplants pre-entry and no centers performed pancreas 




centers perform intestinal transplants pre-entry. The six-month survival rates in Column [3] 
suggest that patients receiving one of the first 21 transplants at centers with experience in lung 
and pancreas transplantation may have higher survival rates than those receiving them at centers 
with only heart or kidney transplant experience or no experience transplanting other organs prior 
to starting their liver transplant program. Other pre-existing transplant programs could be 
important if learning-by-doing occurs in transplantation in general rather than organ-by-organ. 
Such benefits might arise from overlap in areas such as radiology, anesthesiology, physical 
therapy, and mental health services. In addition, some types of organ transplants are more closely 
related to liver transplants than others.  
Within transplantation, a clear divide exists between thoracic transplants (hearts and 
lungs) and abdominal transplants (kidneys, livers, pancreas, and intestines). In fact, the 
fellowship training standards for thoracic and abdominal transplants appear to be set by different 
organizations. The American Board of Internal Medicine provides an advanced heart failure and 
transplant cardiology certification, while the American Society for Transplant Surgeons has 
established guidelines for certification in abdominal transplantation. The latter provides a variety 
of guidelines, including for all four abdominal organs jointly (kidneys, pancreas, livers, and 
intestines). Conversations with transplant doctors confirm that many perform multiple types of 
organ transplants. They also stress that a clear divide exists between “above diaphragm” and 
“below diaphragm” transplants. In terms of interrelated diseases, livers are more frequently 
transplanted simultaneously with kidneys, intestines, and pancreas than with hearts and lungs. 
The patient-level data on multi-organ transplants show that livers were transplanted most 
frequently with kidneys (3,046), followed by intestines (489) and pancreas (384), less frequently 




To explore further how pre-entry experience influences the level of learning-by-doing, I 
modify Equation (1) by interacting the frequency of transplantation and pre-entry experience 
variables with cumulative volume less than or equal to 20, which yields the following equation: 
 
                                                                         
                                                                     
 
Table 15 presents the effects from transplanting other types of organs before starting a 
liver transplant program on early transplant survival outcomes. Column [1] reports results from 
regressing six-month survival on a dummy variable for other types of transplants performed 
before entry into liver transplantation. Operating just any type of other transplant center prior to 
starting a liver program does not convey a statistically significant advantage or disadvantage 
during the first 21 liver transplants. Column [2] breaks the pre-entry experience down by type of 
organ with the omitted category no other types of organs transplanted pre-entry into liver 
transplantation. The main coefficients for the other types of organ transplants are insignificant, 
indicating that on average pre-entry experience has no long-term effect on patient survival. 
Within the first 21 transplants, however, pre-entry lung transplant experience results in a 
statistically significant improvement in early survival outcomes.  
Discussions with transplant surgeons indicated that the benefit of pre-entry lung 
transplant experience might be related to lung transplant programs’ skill in ventilating patients. 
Liver disease can lead to pulmonary hypertension, and both liver disease and complications 
associated with surgery and post-operative recovery can lead to acute respiratory distress 





infections such as pneumonia. In Table 16, I test this explanation for the benefit of pre-entry lung 
transplant experience by interacting two measures associated with a need for ventilation, being 
on a ventilator or on life support at the time of transplant, with being within the first 21 
transplants at a center that performs lung transplants. I focus on transplants early in a center’s 
history because the benefit of pre-entry lung transplant experience appears to apply primarily 
during the learning period. The reference category for pre-entry lung transplant experience is 
pre-entry experience transplanting only other types of transplants or no pre-entry experience. The 
coefficients on the main effects and the interaction terms for the other types of pre-entry 
experience besides lungs are not jointly significantly different from zero or from each other in 
the regressions in Table 15, so for ease of presentation, I simplified the regression to focus on the 
effect of pre-entry lung transplant experience.  
The results for the more direct measure, being on a ventilator at the time of transplant, are 
shown in Column [1]. In Column [2], I present results using the more inclusive measure; whether 
or not a patient is on life support at the time of transplant. Life support can include ventilation 
but also can refer to artificial nutrition and hydration and cardiac support. In any event, a person 
on life support is very sick and thus may be more likely to require mechanical ventilation during 
or post-surgery regardless of whether they were actually on a ventilator at the time of 
transplantation. The percent of patients on a ventilator at the time of transplant ranges from a 
high of 21.2% of patients in 1988 to a low of 5.2% of patients in 2007.
22
 Being on a ventilator is 
highly correlated with being on life support. Just as with being on a ventilator, the percent of 
patients on life support at the time of transplant peaks in 1988 (21.2%) and drops to a low of 
5.7% in 2007.  
                                                          
22
 Given the high correlation between being on life support and being on a ventilator, I omit the variable for life 




The three-way interaction terms in Table 16 show that the beneficial effect during the 
learning period of having pre-entry experience transplanting lungs is particularly beneficial to 
patients on a ventilator or on life support at the time of transplants, which supports the 
hypothesis proposed by the transplant doctors; centers with experience performing lung 
transplants will be more adept at addressing pulmonary complications during and post-liver 
transplantation. The benefits of receiving a transplant at a center with a pre-existing lung 
transplant center during the learning period (the interaction between cumulative volume less than 
or equal to 20 and receiving a transplant at a center with pre-entry lung transplant experience) 
extends to other patients as well, albeit to a smaller extent. This may be because these 
regressions do not separately control for patients for whom pulmonary problems only arise due 
to surgical or post-operative complications. The reported regressions do, however, give a sense 
of whether patients with pre-existing breathing problems or patients likely to suffer surgical 
complications benefit disproportionately from receiving a liver transplant at a center with 
experience performing lung transplants. In addition, the results suggest that the benefits for those 
on life support extend beyond just those patients receiving one of the first 21 transplants at a 
liver transplant center. 
In all the regressions controlling for pre-entry experience, the main coefficient on 
cumulative volume less than or equal to twenty increases in magnitude relative to the results in 
Table 8. This, in combination with the general insignificance of the coefficients on the pre-entry 
experience variables, suggests that the learning-by-doing effect is not just capturing the 






4.2c Pre-entry experience over time 
So far, the best explanation for differences in early outcomes among transplants centers 
relates to the decline in the overall uncertainty about the optimal approach to liver transplantation 
over time, i.e., that on average learning-by-doing exists early in the sample period and does not 
appear to exist by the end of the sample. These averages by period, however, may mask some 
underlying heterogeneity among transplant centers even within periods.  
 In the overall sample, pre-entry experience affected survival outcomes during the 
learning period (transplants 0 to 20), albeit to a smaller extent than the timing of entry.  Both 
factors are hypothesized to affect survival by their effects on the uncertainty about the optimal 
approach to liver transplantation. Therefore, the effect of pre-entry experience may disappear 
over time as knowledge about the optimal approach has become increasingly accessible to new 
centers. In other words, pre-entry experience may matter more when knowledge of how to 
perform a transplant originates through organizational learning-by-doing rather than from the 
generally available knowledge base that arises through industry-level learning and the rapid 
dissemination of best practices. For pre-entry lung transplant experience, its primary effect is 
during the first 21 transplants. On average, after Period 1, no statistically significant 
organizational learning-by-doing exists, and therefore, early survival outcomes may no longer 
benefit from pre-entry experience in lung transplantation.  
 Table 17 shows descriptive statistics for pre-entry experience by period. The 
greatest variation between periods is in the percent of patients affected by lung and pancreas 
transplant experience and no pre-entry experience. In both periods, the majority of patients 




patients receive transplants at centers with heart transplant experience prior to entry into liver 
transplantation. 
Table 18 shows the results for pre-entry experience transplanting other organs by period. 
The coefficient on pre-entry lung transplant experience during the first 21 transplants is 16% 
larger than in the overall results in Table 15. It is slightly less statistically significant, but still has 
a p-value of less than 0.05. Although the coefficient is still fairly large in Period 2, it is no longer 
significant, indicating that, as expected, the benefits of lung transplant experience prior to 
beginning liver transplantation are confined to the period when statistically significant 
organizational learning-by-doing existed.  
Experience transplanting pancreas prior to beginning liver transplantation has a positive 
effect in the pre-1994 period. The pancreas is closely related to the liver and works with the liver 
to perform digestive functions. All centers performing pancreas transplants also perform kidney 
transplants prior to starting their liver transplant programs, so it may be that centers that perform 
pancreas transplants in addition to kidney transplants are more technically sophisticated and 
some of this additional expertise translates to liver transplants. Unfortunately, the data do not 
include variables identifying patients with pancreatic complications. In addition, this effect is not 
specific to the first 21 transplants. 
Again, as in the overall sample, controlling for pre-entry experience increases the size of 
the coefficients on cumulative volume. Although insignificant, the coefficient on cumulative 
volume less than or equal to 20 is almost three times larger in the first period. The results by 
period indicate that pre-entry experience performing other types of transplants does influence the 
magnitude of learning-by-doing during the period in which learning-by-doing exists. Given that 




perhaps not surprising that its influence is less in the second period when there was less 
uncertainty overall about how to successfully perform a liver transplant.    
 
5. Conclusion 
Liver transplant centers learn by doing, but only shortly after entry. The importance of 
learning-by-doing varies among centers with some centers starting at a low survival rate and 
improving, while others enter with high survival rates, and in some cases, exhibit decreasing 
survival rates with experience. The effect of learning-by-doing is primarily evident prior to major 
innovations in immunosuppression and organ allocation and the increasingly specialized training 
of transplant personnel. The importance of how experimental a procedure is for learning-by-
doing appears to be generalizable to other types of organ transplants and may be indicative of 
how learning-by-doing operates in healthcare more generally. The effect of receiving a transplant 
at an inexperienced center is influenced by pre-entry experience performing other types of 
transplants. Experience in lung transplantation is important for liver transplant survival outcomes 
at inexperienced liver transplant centers, especially for patients on a ventilator or on life support 
more generally at the time of transplantation. Prior to 1994, pre-entry experience with 
transplantation of a type of organ closely related to the liver, the pancreas, conveys positive 
benefits for liver transplant outcomes during the time period in which learning was most 
prevalent. The benefits of lung transplant experience for early survival outcomes are also larger 
and more significant prior to 1994.  
These results highlight the importance of focusing on learning-by-doing shortly after 
entry rather than seeking to identify a constant return to experience, regardless of how 




doing I identify follows what has been found in many studies in manufacturing, suggesting that 
organizational learning-by-doing is not a phenomenon unique to reducing unit costs or 
production defects. The heterogeneity across centers supports the limited evidence in the 
literature that the importance of learning-by-doing can vary substantially across firms. The fact 
that early learning-by-doing dissipates over time suggests that technology and policy shocks and 
general industry-level learning may diminish the importance of individual centers’ learning-by-
doing.  
The transience and heterogeneity of the learning-by-doing effect makes formulating 
policy recommendations difficult. In fact, less experienced centers sometimes may have better 
outcomes. However, on average by the period 1994 to 2009, little support exists for 
consolidating care in a limited number of centers in order to improve patient outcomes.  In fact, 
restricting entry may negatively affect those suffering from liver disease if entry restrictions limit 
their access to liver transplantation.   
 For experimental types of complex healthcare procedures, such as intestinal transplants, 
the results in this paper may have policy-relevant implications. With intestinal transplantation, in 
which real uncertainty about the optimal approach still exists, policies consolidating care with 
large existing healthcare providers might limit the number of patients on whom “learning” 
occurs and might avoid the opportunity cost of new centers using these organs less effectively. 
Even with a learning penalty, the probability of extending life would be higher with an intestinal 
transplant than without one based on a six-month post-transplant survival rate above 80% for 
intestinal transplant recipients. Figure 8 shows a map of the locations of intestinal transplant 
centers in 2009. With only 13 centers in 12 states, policies deterring entry into intestinal 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for survival outcomes 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Transplant # 0-10 11-20 21-30 31-40  81-100 
0 to 20 > 
81 to 100  
p-value 
Alive at 1 day  96% 97% 98% 98% 98% 0.00 
Alive at 1 week  92% 92% 96% 95% 96% 0.00 
Alive at 1 month  86% 88% 91% 89% 92% 0.00 
Alive at 3 months  80% 82% 86% 85% 88% 0.00 
Alive at 6 months  77% 78% 83% 82% 85% 0.00 
Alive at 1 year  73% 74% 80% 79% 81% 0.00 
Alive at 3 years  63% 66% 74% 71% 75% 0.00 
Notes: The p-value is for a t-test with the alternative hypothesis that the mean of 0 to 20 is less than the 






Table 2: Descriptive statistics for patient, donor, and match characteristics 
Transplant #: 0-20 81-100 p-value 
Patient characteristics 
Status 1 (a week or less to live) 18% 15% 0.04 
In ICU at transplantation 28% 23% 0.00 
Hospitalized at transplantation (not in ICU) 19% 19% 0.43 
Not hospitalized at transplantation 53% 59% 0.00 
On life support at transplantation 16% 12% 0.00 
Serum creatinine 1.3 1.3 0.15 
Age 38 41 0.00 
Diagnosis: AHN 7% 7% 0.83 
Diagnosis: Biliary atresia 10% 7% 0.00 
Diagnosis: Cirrhosis 47% 50% 0.07 
Diagnosis: Cholestatic liver disease 13% 11% 0.06 
Diagnosis: Metabolic disorder 6% 4% 0.02 
Diagnosis: Neoplasm 5% 5% 0.63 
Multi-organ transplant 2% 3% 0.15 
Previous transplant recipient 8% 9% 0.27 
Days on waitlist 97 154 0.00 
Male recipient 59% 58% 0.44 
African-American recipient 11% 10% 0.31 
Whole liver (rather than segment) 95% 95% 0.32 
Blood type A 40% 41% 0.34 
Blood type AB 4% 3% 0.10 
Blood type B 11% 13% 0.07 
Blood type O 45% 42% 0.14 
Donor and match characteristics 
Live donor 3% 4% 0.46 
Donor age 29 31 0.00 
Cold ischemia time (hours) 10 9 0.44 
Distance from donor hospital to transplant hospital (miles) 214 174 0.00 
Incompatible blood types 16% 22% 0.00 
Compatible blood types 84% 78% 0.00 
Male donor 60% 60% 0.56 
African-American donor 12% 14% 0.01 







Table 3: Main results for early learning-by-doing 
Outcome = alive at six months 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Cumulative volume             
0-10 -0.1149*** -0.1185*** -0.0311 -0.0314 -0.0325* -0.0352* 
 
(0.0184) (0.0191) (0.0190) (0.0191) (0.0191) (0.0185) 
11-20 -0.1041*** -0.1133*** -0.0403** -0.0407** -0.0332* -0.0316* 
 
(0.0186) (0.0188) (0.0180) (0.0180) (0.0171) (0.0166) 
21-30 -0.0501*** -0.0589*** 0.0069 0.0066 0.0030 -0.0096 
 
(0.0141) (0.0150) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0144) (0.0132) 
31-40 -0.0598*** -0.0654*** -0.0067 -0.0067 -0.0058 -0.0049 
 
(0.0166) (0.0176) (0.0160) (0.0161) (0.0170) (0.0161) 
41-50 -0.0333** -0.0376*** 0.0167 0.0162 0.0059 0.0057 
  (0.0136) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0138) (0.0129) 
Observations 56,212 56,212 56,212 56,206 49,349 48,620 
R-squared 0.0045 0.0187 0.0266 0.0286 0.0312 0.0890 
Center fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Donor characteristics 
  
Yes Yes Yes 
Match characteristics 
   
Yes Yes 
Recipient characteristics         Yes 
Notes: The omitted cumulative volume category is cumulative volume > 50. Standard errors are clustered 






Table 4: Logit results 
Outcome = alive at six months 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Cumulative volume             
0-10 -0.0880*** -0.0922*** -0.0392*** -0.0162 -0.0201 
 
 
(0.0112) (0.0118) (0.0125) (0.0126) (0.0132) 
 11-20 -0.0814*** -0.0890*** -0.0398*** -0.0234** -0.0196* 
 
 
(0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0115) 
 21-30 -0.0444*** -0.0513*** -0.0048 0.0086 -0.0056 
 
 
(0.0109) (0.0117) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0103) 
 31-40 -0.0517*** -0.0566*** -0.0137 -0.0022 -0.0005 
 
 
(0.0123) (0.0131) (0.0117) (0.0122) (0.0127) 
 41-50 -0.0310*** -0.0346*** 0.0055 0.0162 0.0073 
 
 
(0.0114) (0.0111) (0.0119) (0.0110) (0.0105) 
 Cumulative 
volume<=20 
     
-0.0193** 
            (0.0095) 
Observations 56,212 56,178 56,212 56,178 48,580 48,580 




Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects 
  
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Patient, donor, and 
match characteristics         Yes Yes 
Notes: The omitted cumulative volume category is cumulative volume>=50. Standard errors are clustered 






Table 5: Additional cumulative volume categories through 200 
Outcome = alive at six months 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Cumulative volume 
   0-21 -0.0297* -0.0327** -0.0324** 
 
(0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0146) 
21-50 -0.0004 -0.0030 -0.0028 
 
(0.0106) (0.0109) (0.0099) 




 101-200 0.0039 
    (0.0075)     
Observations 48,620 48,620 48,620 
R-squared 0.0890 0.0890 0.0890 
Notes: The omitted volume category in Columns [1] is cumulative volume>200; in Column [2], 
cumulative volume>100; and in Column [3] cumulative volume>50. Forty-five centers never reach 200 
transplants during the sample period and 30 never reach 100 transplants. All regressions include donor, 
match and recipient characteristics and center and year fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered at the 






Table 6: Effect of time in operation by quarter 
Outcome = alive at six months 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Quarter           
0 -0.151*** -0.150*** -0.0411 -0.0238 0.0198 
 
(0.0359) (0.0344) (0.0366) (0.0352) (0.0417) 
1 -0.101*** -0.0997*** -0.0166 0.00179 0.0460 
 
(0.0338) (0.0308) (0.0294) (0.0302) (0.0340) 
2 -0.0899*** -0.0813*** 0.00354 -0.00507 0.0330 
 
(0.0282) (0.0286) (0.0288) (0.0278) (0.0297) 
3 -0.0619*** -0.0619*** 0.0247 0.0144 0.0346 
 
(0.0202) (0.0196) (0.0199) (0.0201) (0.0219) 
Cumulative volume 
     0-10 
    
-0.0523** 
     
(0.0237) 
11-20 
    
-0.0396** 
     
(0.0174) 
21-30 
    
-0.0121 
     
(0.0134) 
31-40 
    
-0.0070 
     
(0.0164) 
41-50 
    
0.0045 
          (0.0131) 
Observations 56,212 56,212 56,212 48,620 48,620 
R-squared 0.002 0.016 0.026 0.089 0.089 
Center fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects 
  
Yes Yes Yes 
Patient, donor, and match 
characteristics       Yes Yes 
Notes: Omitted age category = center age > one year. The omitted cumulative volume category is 







Table 7: Effect of time in operation in years 
Outcome = alive at six months 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Center age (years)           
0 -0.112*** -0.133*** -0.0164 -0.0150 0.0353 
 
(0.0235) (0.0211) (0.0252) (0.0252) (0.0328) 
1 -0.0680*** -0.0867*** 0.0133 -0.000963 0.0258 
 
(0.0122) (0.0119) (0.0160) (0.0155) (0.0213) 
2 -0.0659*** -0.0894*** -0.00393 -0.0102 -0.0016 
 
(0.0121) (0.0107) (0.0131) (0.0127) (0.0157) 
3 -0.0533*** -0.0701*** -0.00187 -0.00676 -0.0055 
 
(0.0119) (0.0123) (0.0121) (0.0113) (0.0119) 
4 -0.0408*** -0.0547*** -0.000882 -0.00697 -0.0071 
 
(0.00954) (0.00933) (0.0106) (0.00967) (0.0100) 
5 -0.0402*** -0.0488*** -0.00107 -0.00532 -0.0061 
 
(0.0109) (0.0101) (0.00936) (0.00972) (0.0097) 
Cumulative volume 
     0-10 
    
-0.0582** 
     
(0.0248) 
11-20 
    
-0.0457** 
     
(0.0192) 
21-30 
    
-0.0168 
     
(0.0161) 
31-40 
    
-0.0084 
     
(0.0178) 
41-50 
    
0.0043 
          (0.0138) 
Observations 56,212 56,212 56,212 48,620 48,620 
R-squared 0.005 0.021 0.026 0.089 0.089 
Center fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Patient, donor, and match characteristics Yes Yes 
Notes: Omitted age category = center age > five years. The omitted cumulative volume category is 






Table 8: Reducing volume categories to above or below 21 transplants 
Outcome = alive at six months 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Cumulative volume           
0-10 -0.0352* -0.0359* -0.0351** -0.0335* 
 
 
(0.0185) (0.0182) (0.0175) (0.0175) 
 11-20 -0.0316* -0.0323** -0.0316* -0.0302* 
 
 
(0.0166) (0.0163) (0.0161) (0.0161) 
 21-30 -0.0096 -0.0102 -0.0096 
  
 
(0.0132) (0.0129) (0.0126) 
  31-40 -0.0049 -0.0055 
   
 
(0.0161) (0.0158) 
   41-50 0.0057 
    
 
(0.0129) 
    0-20 
    
-0.0314** 
          (0.0136) 
Observations 48,620 48,620 48,620 48,620 48,620 
R-squared 0.0890 0.0890 0.0890 0.0890 0.0890 
Notes: In Column [1], the omitted cumulative volume category is cumulative volume>50; for Column [2], 
cumulative volume>40; for Column [3], cumulative volume>30, and for Columns [3] to [6], cumulative 
volume>20. All regressions include patient, donor, and match characteristics, and center and year fixed 
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the center-level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
 

















Worse 61 34,392 -0.1216 0.1236 69% 84% 
Better/same   49 29,643 0.0861 0.0727 87% 82% 
Total 110 64,035 -0.0291 0.1466 77% 83% 
Notes: Those that are worse initially and those that are better or the same initially are identified by 
interacting the variable cumulative volume<=20 with the center fixed effects. (Outcome = alive at six 
months.)  The coefficient on the interaction is then added to the main effect of cumulative volume<=20 to 
create the net effect of being within the first 21 transplants for each center separately.  “Worse” centers 
have negative net effects; “Better/same” centers have positive or zero net effects.  The underlying 
regressions include patient, donor and match characteristics, and center and year fixed effects with the 







Table 10: Descriptive statistics by period 
  1987-1993 1994-2009 
Panel A 





Six-month survival  79% 41% 89% 32% 
Six-month survival 0 to 20 69% 46% 85% 35% 




centers # of patients 
# of 
centers # of patients 
Entrants 86 6,459 34 57,856 
Centers with cumulative volume<=20 86 1,215 67 1,199 




Table 11: Main results by period 
Outcome = alive at six months 
  (1) (2) 
  1987-1993 1994-2009 
Cumulative volume 
  0-10 -0.0738** -0.0021 
 
(0.0298) (0.0186) 
11-20 -0.0520** -0.0214 
 
(0.0259) (0.0205) 
21-30 -0.0310 -0.0018 
 
(0.0236) (0.0132) 
31-40 -0.0429 0.0118 
 
(0.0273) (0.0191) 
41-50 -0.0159 0.0050 
 
(0.0257) (0.0145) 
Observations 4,496 44,124 
R-squared 0.1742 0.0768 
Notes: The omitted cumulative volume category is cumulative volume > 50. All regressions include 
center and state fixed effects and patient, donor and match characteristics. Standard errors are clustered at 





Table 12: Results for three time periods 
Outcome = alive at six months 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
  1987-1993 1994-2002 2003-2009 
Cumulative volume 
   0-10 -0.0738** -0.0186 0.0379* 
 
(0.0298) (0.0309) (0.0219) 
11-20 -0.0520** -0.0187 -0.0160 
 
(0.0259) (0.0312) (0.0221) 
21-30 -0.0310 0.0049 -0.0068 
 
(0.0236) (0.0185) (0.0195) 
31-40 -0.0429 0.0138 0.0202 
 
(0.0273) (0.0302) (0.0214) 
41-50 -0.0159 0.0087 0.0175 
  (0.0257) (0.0196) (0.0210) 
Observations 4,496 17,255 26,869 
R-squared 0.1742 0.1046 0.0562 
Notes: The omitted cumulative volume category is cumulative volume > 50. All regressions include 
center and year fixed effects and patient, donor, and match characteristics. Standard errors are clustered 













P1 to P2 
Patient characteristics 
Status 1 (a week or less to live) 18% 11% 0.00 
In ICU at transplantation 23% 18% 0.00 
Hospitalized at transplantation (not in ICU) 19% 18% 0.00 
Not hospitalized at transplantation 58% 65% 0.00 
On life support at transplantation 16% 9% 0.00 
Serum creatinine 1.3 1.4 0.00 
Age 40 47 0.00 
Diagnosis: AHN 7% 6% 0.12 
Diagnosis: Biliary atresia 9% 4% 0.00 
Diagnosis: Cirrhosis 49% 51% 0.00 
Diagnosis: Cholestatic liver disease 18% 10% 0.00 
Diagnosis: Metabolic disorder 5% 3% 0.00 
Diagnosis: Neoplasm 3% 10% 0.00 
Multi-organ transplant 2% 5% 0.00 
Previous transplant recipient 9% 8% 0.07 
Days on waitlist 82 234 0.00 
Male recipient 55% 64% 0.00 
African-American recipient 10% 10% 0.89 
Whole liver (rather than segment) 100% 93% 0.00 
Blood type A 40% 38% 0.00 
Blood type AB 4% 5% 0.01 
Blood type B 12% 13% 0.02 
Blood type O 43% 44% 0.42 
Donor and match characteristics 
Live donor 0% 5% 0.00 
Donor age 27 37 0.00 
Male donor 63% 59% 0.00 
African-American donor 11% 14% 0.00 
Cold ischemia time (hours) 11 8 0.00 
Distance from donor hospital to transplant hospital (miles) 265 155 0.00 
Compatible blood types 89% 78% 0.00 
Incompatible blood types 11% 22% 0.00 









Table 14: Descriptive statistics for pre-entry experience 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
% of patients 
within the first 
21 transplants 











Pre-liver heart transplants* 52% 1206 79% 61 
Pre-liver lung transplants*† 20% 453 83% 23 
Pre-liver kidney transplants* 85% 1960 77% 100 
Pre-liver pancreas transplants *† 19% 445 82% 22 
Pre-liver intestines transplants* n/a 0 n/a 0 
No pre-liver transplants* 13% 297 75% 16 
*Only includes centers entering after 1987, since data on all organs is only available after October 1987. 
†Only one transplant center performs lung transplants that does not perform heart transplants prior to 
starting liver transplantation. No centers perform pancreas transplants that do not perform kidney 






Table 15: Pre-entry experience 
Outcome = alive at six months 
  (1) (2) 
Cumulative volume<=20 -0.0700* -0.0634* 
 
(0.0387) (0.0353) 











































Cumulative volume<=20*pancreas center 
 
0.0250 
    (0.0295) 
Observations 48,620 48,620 
R-squared 0.0771 0.0774 
Notes: The omitted category for pre-entry experience is no other types of transplants pre-liver. 
Observations for centers entering before 1988 are not included, since I cannot measure pre-liver activity 
prior to 1988. All regressions include case mix and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the 








Table 16: Targeted benefit of lung transplant experience 
Outcome = alive at six months 
  (1) (2) 
Cumulative volume<=20 -0.0615*** -0.0609*** 
 
(0.0180) (0.0176) 
Pre-entry lung transplant experience -0.0004 -0.0042 
 
(0.0078) (0.0069) 




 Cumulative volume<=20*lung center 0.0599** 0.0543** 
 
(0.0247) (0.0253) 



























Cumulative volume<=20*lung center*life support 
 
0.1211** 
    (0.0607) 
Observations 48,656 48,620 
R-squared 0.0771 0.0780 
Notes: Pre-entry lung transplant experience is relative to other or no other organ transplant experience 
prior to beginning liver transplants. Given the high correlation between a patient being on a ventilator at 
the time of transplant and being on life support at the time of transplants, I only include one of the 
variables in each of the regressions. All regressions include patient, donor, and match controls and year 












Table 17: Descriptive statistics for pre-entry experience by period 
  1987-1993 1994-2009 
Pre-liver heart transplants* 50% 37 54% 36 
Pre-liver lung transplants*† 15% 12 24% 16 
Pre-liver kidney transplants* 82% 60 88% 60 
Pre-liver pancreas transplants*† 12% 8 26% 17 
No pre-liver transplants* 18% 18 9% 5 
*Only includes centers entering after 1987, since data on all organs is only available after October 1987. 
†No centers perform pancreas transplants but not kidney transplants prior to starting liver transplants. 






Table 18: Pre-liver experience by period 
Outcome = alive at six months 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  1987-1993 1994-2009 1987-1993 1994-2009 
Cumulative volume<=20 -0.0763 -0.0488 -0.0831 -0.0295 
 
(0.0528) (0.0313) (0.0530) (0.0298) 








  Pre-liver heart transplant center 
  
0.0137 -0.0003 
   
(0.0242) (0.0082) 
Pre-liver lung transplant center 
  
0.0127 0.0037 
   
(0.0220) (0.0081) 
Pre-liver kidney transplant center 
  
-0.0018 -0.0088 
   
(0.0270) (0.0103) 
Pre-liver pancreas transplant center 
  
0.0592** -0.0066 
   
(0.0236) (0.0082) 
Cumulative volume<=20*heart center 
  
-0.0305 -0.0195 
   
(0.0455) (0.0396) 
Cumulative volume<=20*lung center 
  
0.0972** 0.0624 
   
(0.0457) (0.0385) 
Cumulative volume<=20*kidney center 
  
-0.0059 0.0029 
   
(0.0652) (0.0362) 
Cumulative volume<=20*pancreas center 
  
-0.0531 0.0220 
      (0.0429) (0.0349) 
Observations 4,496 44,124 4,496 44,124 
R-squared 0.1209 0.0657 0.1233 0.0658 
Notes: The omitted category for pre-entry experience is no other types of transplants pre-liver. In 
Columns [3] and [4], the omitted category for the time variables is time greater than three months since 
the prior transplant. Observations for centers entering before 1988 are not included, since I cannot 
measure pre-liver activity prior to 1988. All regressions include patient, donor, and match characteristics 










Figure 1: Organ allocation 
 
 
Source: Association of Organ Procurement Organizations 
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Figure 3: Center-specific learning effects 
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Figure 5: Pr(alive at six months) by cumulative volume 
 




















































































Removing Financial Barriers to Organ and Bone Marrow Donation: 
The Effect of Leave and Tax Legislation in the U.S. 





In virtually every country, the demand for organs and bone marrow far exceeds supply, 
leaving many patients to spend years and even die waiting for donated organs or bone marrow. 
In the U.S., for instance, the median wait-time until death or transplantation was 276 days for a 
liver and 547 days for a kidney in 2005, and only slightly over 60% of individuals waitlisted ever 
received an organ. Approximately 3,000 individuals die each year because they cannot find a 
matching bone marrow donor.
23
 In addition to the implications for transplant candidates, a 
kidney transplant also saves at least $90,000 over the life of the individual relative to on-going 
dialysis treatment (Matas and Schnitzler, 2003). This supply shortage and the associated costs, 
loss in quality of life and even life itself drive the ongoing debate as to whether donors should 
receive some form of compensation in order to increase organ and bone marrow donation.  
Concerns about exploitation of the poor and sick, adverse selection, motivational 
crowding out, and a general aversion or “repugnance” toward the commercialization of body 
parts have influenced the debate heavily (Frey, 1993; Roth, 2007; Titmuss, 1971). Some scholars 
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 These statistics are available from the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) and the National 




and policymakers have manifested an aversion to any form of explicit reward for organ donors 
whereas others have advocated direct monetary payments. Becker and Elias (2007), for instance, 
estimate that amounts of $15,000 and $38,000 would enable markets for kidneys and livers, 
respectively, to clear.
24
 Others see direct cash payments as potentially deleterious or socially 
unacceptable, but are open to considering some form of “in-kind” rewards to help reduce the 
supply shortage of human organs and tissue (Frey, 1993; Lacetera and Macis, 2010, 2012; Leider 
and Roth, 2010; Rodrigue et al., 2009; Roth et al., 2004).
25
 Singapore and Israel have instituted 
priority rules for organ donors to reward those with signed donor cards and their families (Biyar, 
2011; Duenwald and Shipley, 2011).
26
 Israel also allows some direct payments to donor families 
to “memoralize” post-cadaveric donation, as well as more direct forms of compensation such as 
an exemption from health insurance premiums for living donors (Levush, 2010; Satel, 2010). 
Several European countries make organ donation an opt-out rather than an opt-in decision; 
according to some observers, this has led to significantly higher organ donation rates (Abadie 
and Gay, 2006). 
In this paper, we present a comprehensive study of the impact of legislative efforts in the 
U.S. to mitigate the organ and bone marrow supply shortage by removing disincentives to 
donation without offering direct compensation, primarily through work leave legislation and tax 
credits and deductions. Specifically, between 1989 and 2009, a number of U.S. states passed 
legislation that grants paid or unpaid leave to state employees (and in some cases private 
                                                          
24
 The only country without an organ supply shortage is Iran, where the sale of kidneys has been legal since 1988. 
The Iranian government pays $1,200 and provides health insurance for one year to cover surgery-related conditions. 
In addition, the vendor receives between about $2,300 and $4,500 either from the recipient or one of several 
designated charitable organizations (Hippen, 2008). “Gray” market prices for kidneys posted by websites offering to 
coordinate procurement and transplantation internationally (a.k.a. “transplant tourism”) range from $14,000 to 
$85,000 (Shimazono, 2007). 
25
 Byrne and Thompson (2001) identify additional mechanisms that could lead to perverse effects of incentives, 
including time-inconsistency issues related to rewards for donor registration.  
26





employees), tax deductions to individuals who donate their organs or bone marrow, and tax 
credits to employers for promoting donation.  
We quantify the effects of these types of legislation on both organ and bone marrow 
donations. For organ donations, we focus on the two most commonly donated organs, livers and 
kidneys, which account for over 80% of all organs donated and almost 100% of all donations 
from live donors. In addition, the gap between supply and demand is much larger for kidneys and 
livers relative to hearts, lungs, pancreas, and intestines.
27
 We also assess whether the impact of 
the legislation varies by gender and donor-recipient relationship. Even though the tax and leave 
legislation apply primarily to living donors, we assess whether cadaveric donations are affected 
as well. We do so for two main reasons: first, if donations from living and deceased donors 
follow a common time trend, the donations by deceased donors might be used as a “control” 
group. Second, these types of donations might actually be substitutes (Fernandez, Howard, and 
Stohr, 2012); if so, legislation targeting one type of donors might have effects on the other type 
as well. We also study whether these laws affect the distribution of organ quality, as measured by 
the state-level post-transplant graft survival rate. For bone marrow donations, we explore 
potential differential effects by donation method: aspiration or apheresis.
28
  
A priori, if the incentives implied by the legislation were to have a positive impact on 
donation, we should expect these laws to influence bone marrow donors more than organ donors. 
Bone marrow donation has a much lower risk of complications and death than does organ 
donation, and is much less burdensome to the donor in terms of recovery time, pain, and 
                                                          
27
 The Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network. 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/latestData/advancedData.asp. Accessed 07/04/2012. 
28
 In apheresis, a prospective donor undergoes five days of drug injections to stimulate the production of specialized 
blood cells, which are then filtered out of the donor’s blood over the course of several hours, much as in plasma 
donation. The alternative method of aspiration requires removal of actual bone marrow from the hip of the donor, a 




suffering. Also, bone marrow regenerates and can be donated multiple times, whereas kidneys 
never re-grow. In the case of livers, which also regenerate, no cases of multiple donations are 
documented in the literature or the data and any prior hepatobiliary surgery complicates future 
transplant surgery should the donor ever need a liver transplant (Maddey and Van Thiel, 1988).  
In other words, bone marrow donation is less costly for a donor; therefore, at the margin, 
moderate incentives should tip the trade-off toward deciding to donate in the case of bone 
marrow more than they do for organs. For similar reasons, we differentiate between livers and 
kidneys within organ donation and, within bone marrow, aspiration and apheresis. The risk of 
complications or death and the recovery period are greatest for liver donation and lowest for 
apheresis donations (Confer et al., 2003; Karanes et al. 2003; Muzaale et al., 2011; Segev et al., 
2010). 
Our empirical strategy exploits the fact that different states have introduced legislation at 
different points in time, which provides us with several “natural experiments.” We take 
advantage of the longitudinal nature of our dataset to lessen potentially important selection, 
endogeneity, and omitted variable problems. In our regression models, we include state fixed 
effects as well as state-specific time trends to ensure that we are controlling for omitted time-
invariant factors and for selection into adopting the legislation based on the level and growth rate 
of the outcome variables (Ashenfelter and Card, 1985; Heckman and Hotz, 1989). To probe the 
validity of our identification strategy, we assess whether pre-existing trends in the demand for 
organs predict the adoption of legislation. 
Our results indicate that the legislation had no overall effect on the number of organ 
donations. This result is robust across a variety of specifications and sub-samples, and holds also 




consistent with our prior, we do find a positive effect of leave legislation on bone marrow 
donation. Specifically, we find a positive effect of leave legislation for state employees on bone 
marrow donations, provided that a sufficient share of a state’s labor force is state-employed (i.e., 
when the size of the population actually affected by the law is larger). Our estimated coefficient 
implies that leave legislation for state employees has a positive effect on bone marrow donations 
if state employees represent at least 5% of the labor force, which is the case for about 45% of our 
sample of state-years. 
We have also considered the effects of the legislation on organ quality, as proxied by six-
month and three-year post-transplant graft survival rates, to test if the legislation might be 
causing shifts in the underlying quality distribution of organs used for transplantation even in the 
absence of changes in the overall number of transplants. This could happen if the legislation has 
opposed effects on different types of living donors. For example, the laws might lead to 
increased donation among the less intrinsically motivated donors and decreased donation among 
the more intrinsically motivated. The latter types of donors may be of higher “quality” (Titmuss, 
1971); therefore, the incentives implied by the legislation may lead to a shift in the overall 
quality of organs donated. We find an overall positive effect for three-year-survival from leave 
for state employees although the estimated coefficients are only marginally statistically 
significant. We also find a positive effect of leave for private employees on six-month survival 
rates of recipients of organs from male donors and positive effects of individual tax credits on 
six-month survival rates of recipients of organs from female donors. These results suggest that 
the laws may affect the distribution of organs donated or the distribution of organs used even in 




Our study contributes to a small but growing literature in economics on organ and bone 
marrow donation. Two recent papers have looked at the effects of a variety of traffic safety laws 
on cadaveric organ donation, such as motorcycle helmet laws, primary seat belt enforcement 
laws, and speed limits (Dickert-Conlin, Elder, and Moore, 2012; Fernandez, Howard and Stohr, 
2012). Kessler and Roth (2012) studied the effect of priority rules in a laboratory experiment. A 
number of studies (e.g., Roth et al., 2004, 2005a, 2005b) have analyzed the use of kidney 
exchanges, which cross-match incompatible donor and recipient pairs to create compatible 
donor-recipient pairs. Bagozzi et al. (2001) documented differences in bone marrow donation 
across different cultures, and Bergstrom, Garratt and Sheehan-Connor (2009 and 2012) analyzed 
the optimal size and racial composition of bone marrow registries. Although the effects of non-
cash legislated incentives on many types of pro-social behavior, including health-related 
activities (e.g., blood donation), have now been studied extensively, the literature has just begun 
to study the effects of such legislation on the much more “costly” pro-social behavior involved in 
organ and bone marrow donation.  
The overall scarcity of organ and bone marrow donors and the difficulty in matching 
between donors and recipients make natural experiments such as the ones exploited in this paper 
particularly important for determining how well such legislation performs in solving the severe 
organ and bone marrow shortage problem existing in the U.S. A few similar but more limited 
studies exist. Venkataramani et al. (2012) examined the effect of tax deductions for individuals 
on living organ donation. Bilgel (2011) and Wellington and Sayre (2011) studied tax deductions 
for individuals and leave legislation for state employees, but consider only organs and not bone 
marrow (Bilgel) and only kidneys (Wellington and Sayre). In addition to the types of legislation 




legislation granting leave to private employees and tax credits to employers for donation-
promoting activities. Boulware et al. (2008) included all four types of legislation, but only 
consider kidney donations, and do not control for state-specific time-invariant factors, factors 
that vary over time but are common to all states, or pre-existing trends in state-level donation 
rates. We also explore whether these laws affected the quality of organs donated. Perhaps most 
importantly, our paper is the first to we examine the effects of these policies also on bone 
marrow donations, for which theoretical considerations lead us to anticipate stronger effects. In 
fact, like in our study, these other papers document no effect of the laws examined on organ 
donation. The positive effect we find on bone marrow donation, in addition to its relevance for 
policy and health consideration, supports an “incentive size” explanation for the zero result on 
organs, namely that the incentives may be too low for more "costly" donations but may work for 
less invasive procedures such as bone marrow donation. This is consistent with the positive 




In Section 2 we offer background information on the history of organ and bone marrow 
donation and the associated legislation. In Section 3 we describe the data, and in Section 4 we 
present and discuss our empirical strategy. We report the results in Section 5, and in Section 6 
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 Through utilizing the UNOS data request process rather than relying on OPTN’s online data tool, we were able to 
obtain transplant-level data, which we aggregated at the state level. With the exception of Boulware et al. (2008) the 
prior studies cited above use data aggregated at the donation service area level, not the state level. Although 
donation service areas usually align with state boundaries, 32 of the 58 donation service areas in the U.S. include 








In 1954, the first successful living donor kidney transplant was performed, followed by 
the first successful cadaveric donor kidney transplant in 1962. The first successful cadaveric liver 
transplant occurred in 1967 between identical twins. Bone marrow was first successfully 
transplanted in 1973. A living donor liver was not successfully transplanted until 1989. 
Long-term dialysis treatment became available in 1960, greatly extending the life 
expectancy of individuals with renal failure and with that, the demand for kidney transplants. 
The Food and Drug Administration’s approval of the immunosuppressant cyclosporine in 1983 
transformed organ transplantation from a high-risk experimental procedure with almost certain 
organ rejection to a common treatment for organ failure. In the late 1990s, laparoscopic surgery 
greatly reduced the pain and recovery time for live kidney donors.
31
  
As science and technological progress developed ever more effective transplantation 
methods, policymakers sought, in a variety of ways, to facilitate the use of these new methods 
and influence the exchange of organs. Medicare has paid for dialysis since 1972, kidney 
transplants since 1978, and liver transplants since 1990.
32
 As for bone marrow, Medicare began 
coverage in 1978 and expanded it in 1985 and in 2010. Federal law increased the supply of 
deceased donor organs by expanding the definition of “death” to include “brain death” in 1981. 
In 1984, the National Organ Transplant Act banned the sale of organs and bone marrow, and the 
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 We focus here on the two human organs and one type of tissue included in this study: kidneys, livers, and bone 
marrow. Lungs, hearts, and intestines can be donated by living donors, but this occurs extremely rarely, so we drop 
these from our sample. (Deceased donors are required for heart transplants except for the case of domino transplants 




 Medicare approved liver transplantation for a limited number of conditions in 1990. This coverage was expanded 
to all end-stage liver disease patients except those with Hepatitis B or liver cancer. In 1996, Hepatitis B became 





Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) was established to promote organ 
donation, facilitate the allocation of organs, and serve as a central repository of organ-donation-
related data. OPTN’s bone marrow counterpart, the National Marrow Donation Program 
(NMDP) was established two years later in 1986. In 1994, a federal law was passed to provide 
leave of absence for bone marrow (5 days) and organ (30 days) donation by federal employees. 
Federal law also started requiring hospitals to notify organ procurement organizations of all 
eligible deaths in 1998, so that all might have the opportunity to donate. 
Although organs from deceased donors are still the main source for transplants, this 
supply is inherently limited by the death rate, the type of deaths, and the decomposition process. 
Only a small percentage of deaths yield viable organs and, although improvements in storage and 
transportation of organs have occurred, kidneys are only viable for up to 24 hours and livers for 
up to 12 hours without a living blood supply. Despite over two million deaths in the U.S. in 
2009, eligible deaths documented by UNOS totaled only 9,827.
33
 These deaths yielded organs 
used in 11,285 kidney transplants and 6,098 liver transplants, supplemented with 6,387 live 
kidney donations and 219 live liver donations. Meanwhile, 33,663 people joined the kidney 
waitlist and 10,706 joined the liver waitlist in 2009. Bone marrow donations must come from 
living donors exclusively, but individual donors can donate more than once, making the bone 
marrow supply less inherently limited than the supply of donor organs. 
Donating an organ or bone marrow exacts financial costs and at least some risk of pain 
and immediate and future health risks. Even though payers of organ and bone marrow transplants 
also pay the costs of recovery, both types of donors face costs in terms of time away from work, 
travel, and lodging. Prohibited by law from paying direct compensation to donors, states have 
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 This may be a lower bound since UNOS does not track information on all deaths. Gortmaker et al. (1996) 




attempted to address the organ shortfall by offsetting the incidental costs associated with 
donation and protecting employees from employer retaliation for leave taken to donate. The 
health risk remains: for kidney donors 3.1 deaths per 10,000 donors and as high as 17 per 10,000 
for liver donors (Muzaale et al., 2011; Segev et al., 2010). In addition, donors may experience 




2.2 Leave and tax legislation 
States have attempted to address the organ and bone marrow shortfalls through a variety 
of methods that diminish the financial barriers to donation: leave for state employees, leave for 
private employees, tax credits for employers, and tax deductions for individuals. In general, laws 
granting leave offer up to 30 days for organ donation and up to one week for bone marrow 
donation. Tax deductions for individuals cover non-medical donation-related expenses up to a 
maximum of $10,000. Tax credits for employers cover donation-promoting activities, including 
the provision of paid leave to donors. Tables 19 (organs) and 20 (bone marrow) list the dates of 
passage for each type of legislation by state. (Legal references are listed in the appendix by 
state.)  In 1989, Colorado passed the first relevant legislation providing state employees leave for 
the donation of an organ or bone marrow. Since then, most states have implemented legislation 
removing financial disincentives to donation through leave or tax legislation. For organ donation, 
thirty-one states offer leave for state employees, seven states offer leave for private employees, 
sixteen states give tax deductions to individuals and three states provide tax credits to employers. 
For bone marrow donations, thirty-three states offer leave for state employees, eleven states offer 
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leave for private employees, fifteen states give tax incentives to individuals and four states give 




3. Data and descriptive statistics 
3.1 Organs 
Patient-level data on kidney and liver transplants come from the Organ Procurement and 
Transplantation Network (OPTN).
36
 From a total of 358,378 individual-level transplants, we 
obtained 1,071 state-year level observations with 51 observations per year from 1988, when 
OPTN began collecting data, through 2008.
37
 Note that our data counts are transplants: we only 
count the organs actually used for transplantation, not organs recovered or donors consenting. 
However, because our main focus is on living donors, the number of organs recovered and the 
number of organs transplanted is the same.  
Figures 2A and 2B describe how the volume and composition of organ donations have 
changed over time. Kidneys are the most common organ transplanted, followed by livers. 
Together these account for most of the organs transplanted in the U.S. and over 99% of all living 
donor organs. Kidney, liver and bone marrow donations generally increased until the late 2000s. 
This pattern, however, is much stronger for kidneys vis-à-vis livers and bone marrow. An overall 
upward trend in donations of both cadaveric and living donors exists until the late 2000s. 
Cadaveric donations far exceed those from living donors and underscore how infrequently 
                                                          
35
 Further details on the specifics of the laws are available at: 
http://sitemaker.umich.edu/sarah.stith/files/lms_organdonation_onlineappendix.pdf . 
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 “The data reported here have been supplied by the United Network for Organ Sharing as the contractor for the 
Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network. The interpretation and reporting of these data are the 
responsibility of the authors and in no way should be seen as an official policy of or interpretation by the OPTN or 
the U.S. Government.” (http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/shareddownloadables/data_use_agreement.pdf)  
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 Total observations in the regressions considering livers only are lower because some state-years had no living 
donor transplants. For the regressions that analyzed organ quality changes, non-reporting of covariates leads to a 
reduction in observations. In the quality regressions using six-month and three-year survival rates as the outcome 




compatible living donors come forward, although every human is born with two kidneys and a 
liver that can lose up to 70% of its size and still re-grow.  
The highly detailed organ data include many variables associated with the medical 
procedure and demographics of both the transplant recipient and the donor. Table 21 reports 
summary statistics. On average, cadaveric donations dominate living donations with kidneys 
being the more common organ donated relative to livers. Males donate more organs overall, but 
this is due to more males donating cadaveric organs, while females dominate living donation. A 
variety of explanations could exist – men are more likely to die in accidents and tend to die 
earlier. Women may have more flexible work lives and might simply be more altruistic or more 
cautious about opting in to cadaveric organ donation. For livers, almost 94% of transplant 
recipients receive a cadaveric donor organ, while for kidneys about 30% receive a living donor 
organ. These differences suggest that we should break down our main analyses by both gender 
and organ. Table 22 shows the distribution of transplants by type of donor-recipient relationship. 
Most live donors are biologically related to the transplant recipient. This likely arises in part due 
to donor-recipient capability issues, which mean family members are more likely to match the 
recipient’s blood type and other match factors than a random person from the general population. 
Approximately 18% of living donors are not spouses and are biologically unrelated.  
 
3.2 Bone marrow 
Bone marrow donation data were obtained from the National Marrow Donor Program 
(NMDP). We have a total of 14,463 transplants. The total number of donations omits 




whom no state of residence was recorded.
38
 Table 23 contains descriptive statistics for bone 
marrow donations. The table reveals that both males and females donate at equal rates. Apheresis 
is a less common type of donation, largely due to its later uptake. Our data document no 
apheresis donations prior to 1999. By 2009, 0.7 apheresis donations occurred along with 0.3 
aspiration donations, per one million population. 
 
3.3 Legislation 
The legislative data are compiled from donor program websites (www.optn.org and 
www.ncls.org), state government websites, and searches of state laws via Nexis®. We categorize 
the leave incentives into leave for employees of the state government (hereinafter “state 
employees”) and leave for private sector employees (hereinafter “private employees”). Taxes fall 
into two categories: individual tax deductions of up to $10,000 or employer tax credits for 




4. Empirical strategy 
Our empirical strategy exploits the fact that different states introduced legislation in 
different years; we use variation both across and within states over time to identify the effect of 
the legislation on a series of outcomes of interest. Specifically, we estimate a reduced-form 
model that takes the following form: 
 
Ykt = LEAVEkt’leave + TAXkt’tax + Xkt’ + k + t + γkt + kt.  (1) 
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 Although our organ data contain all organs transplanted, our bone marrow data are limited by the fact that only 
36,800 of the total 54,140 requests for donations recorded include state-identifying information. Most omitted 
requests involve international and Department of Defense donors. Our outcome variables include only those 14,463 
requests for donation that result in actual donation of bone marrow.  
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In Equation (1), Ykt is the outcome variable in state k in year t, and we consider three 
main outcome variables: the number of organ donors standardized by one million population, the 
number of bone marrow donations per one million population, and post-organ transplant survival 
rates. LEAVEkt and TAXkt are indicators for whether state k had leave legislation or tax legislation 
in place, respectively, in year t. More specifically, we include indicators for whether a state has 
leave provisions for state employees, leave provisions for private employees, tax deductions for 
individuals, and/or tax credits for employers. The vector of controls Xkt includes state-level 
income per capita and the unemployment rate, which could affect the availability and 
accessibility of transplant surgery. In the organ quality regressions, we also include donor, 
match, and patient characteristics to control for the differences in the types of donors, matches, 
and patients across states. Year fixed effects (t) account for aggregate factors that might affect 
the outcome variables, including nation-wide policy changes as well as secular trends in attitudes 
toward organ and marrow donation. k are state fixed effects, γkt are state-specific time trends, 
and kt is an error term. The main coefficients of interest, leave and tax, measure the within-state 
effect of passing a given type of legislation on the number of donations per million population, 
controlling for factors affecting all states in a given year, and state-specific fixed effects and time 
trends. In all regressions, standard errors are clustered at the state level to account for serial 
correlation in the state law indicators (Bertrand et al., 2004).
40
  
Not all states have introduced such laws and different states have introduced the 
legislation at different times. This raises the question of whether the adopting states differ from 
the non-adopting states in fundamental ways that are correlated with our outcomes of interest. 
For instance, states with systematically higher levels of organ donations per capita might be 
                                                          
40
 In addition to the specifications described above, we used logs and other nonlinear variations and/or 
normalizations of the outcome variables. We also increased the frequency of the observations to months and quarters 




more likely to introduce the legislation, perhaps due to greater familiarity with donation in the 
population or the transplant community’s outreach efforts. In that case, a positive coefficient on 
the tax indicators might simply reflect this underlying heterogeneity rather than an effect of the 
law. The opposite is also possible; in other words, states with lower levels of organ or bone 
marrow donations per capita may be more likely to adopt the legislation in response to a shortage 
of organs. That case would bias our coefficient estimates downward. The inclusion of state fixed 
effects mitigates the bias that would occur if states adopted legislation based on the level of the 
outcome variable. Further, we include state-specific time trends to account for the possibility that 
states with systematically lower or higher growth rates of the outcome variable might be more 
likely to adopt the legislation.  
To probe our identification strategy, we checked whether the passage of the legislation in 
a given state-year correlated with the lagged (one year) cumulative number of waitlist candidates 
per one million population; the lagged number of waitlist candidates year per one million 
population; the lagged number of waitlist candidates who died or were too sick for transplant, per 
one million population; and the lagged cumulative number of individuals who ever left the 
waitlist dead or too sick for a transplant. We use these variables to proxy for lagged values of 
cumulative demand, current demand, cumulative excess demand, and current excess demand. 
Table 24 reports summary statistics for these variables. On average, seventy individuals per one 
million population were awaiting an organ in a given state-year and four individuals per one 
million population die on the waitlist or are deemed too sick for transplantation each year.
41
 We 
regress a dummy variable equal to one if a law was passed in the current year on lagged values 
(from the prior year) of the waitlist variables in Table 24. As shown in Table 25, the estimated 
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 The waitlist figure is larger for kidneys due primarily to better waitlist survival rates allowed for by dialysis. No 




coefficients are generally small and not statistically significant (with only two exceptions where 
the coefficients are small and marginally significant), indicating that prior values of these 
variables did not generally have any discernible effect on whether a state passed a law.
42
 These 
results, together with our inclusion of year and state effects and state-level time trends in the 
regressions, make us confident about the validity of our identification strategy. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Organ donations: Main results 
We first estimate model (1) using total organ transplants per one million population as the 
dependent variable in columns [1] through [5] of Table 26, and living and cadaveric donor 
transplants separately in columns [6] and [7]. Although the tax and leave legislation generally 
target living donors, we consider donations from both living and deceased donors for two main 
reasons. First, one could postulate that donations from living and deceased donors follow a 
common time trend, and precisely because the legislation targets living donations, the donations 
by deceased donors might be seen as a benchmark, or “control” group. The second reason to 
study the effects on both living and deceased donations is that these types of donations might 
actually be substitutes, in which case donations from deceased donors could not be used as a 
control because under this hypothesis they would be affected by the legislation. For example, the 
waitlist only applies to potential recipients of cadaveric organs. If more living organs are 
donated, these individuals will drop from the waitlist, which might enable the donor-recipient 
matching process to be more selective as to which cadaveric organs are used in transplantation.
43
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 Specifications where we used two- or three-year lags deliver similar results. 
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 Organs vary in quality, so without an increase in the number of transplants, an increase in the number of living 
donors should lead to a smaller group of individuals accessing the same pool of cadaveric donor organs, thus 
allowing only the highest quality organs to be selected. Donor factors correlated with survival outcomes after liver 




Additionally, the employer tax credits could (in some states) apply to expenses incurred in 
promoting cadaveric donation as well as living donation. For these reasons, it is informative to 
study the effect of the legislation on both types of donations separately. 
The results shown in column [1], which do not include state or year effects, indicate a 
positive correlation between the number of transplants and the existence of leave for state 
employees and leave for private sector employees; however, the coefficient estimates 
dramatically drop in magnitude and cease to be statistically significant when we introduce year 
and state fixed effects. In column [5] we add state-specific linear time trends, and again all of our 
coefficients of interest are estimated to be small and not statistically significant. These results 
underscore the importance of accounting for state-level heterogeneity and aggregate time effects, 
with the latter having the largest impact on our coefficient estimates of interest. Specifically, it 
would appear that the positive estimated coefficients on the legislation indicators in column [1] 
were reflecting a general trend of increasing donations over time. 
Breaking down the analysis by live and cadaveric donations in columns [6] and [7] does 
not change the main results. We also consider the possibility that effects may differ for men and 
women due in part to men’s greater attachment to the workforce, the target of the tax and, 
especially, the leave legislation, and report the results in Table 27. Again, we find no significant 
effects. Lastly, we differentiate between kidneys and livers in Table 28. Here, too, we obtain 
estimated coefficients that are both small and statistically insignificant. The single exception, in 
the absence of more defined patterns in the data, should, more plausibly, be attributed to random 
chance.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
than whole liver grafts, African-American race, less height, and cerebrovascular causes of death (Feng et al., 2006). 
For kidneys, donor characteristics associated with poorer transplant outcomes include age, cerebrovascular causes of 




5.1a Organ donations: Additional analyses 
We perform a number of further analyses to probe the (null) results described above.  
Balanced Panel. First, our panel extends from 1/1/1988 to 12/31/2008. However, most of 
the legislation occurred around and after the year 2000. To reduce the influence of the long lags, 
in most cases, before the passage of legislation, we estimate model (1) using a panel including 
five years before passage of any tax or leave legislation and five years after the passage of that 
first legislation, omitting the year of introduction of the legislation.
44
 Focusing on the period of 
time in which we can most confidently attribute differences in the number of live and cadaveric 
donors between states with and without legislation to the legislation, we still find no effect from 
the passage of these laws.
45
 
Related vs. Unrelated Donors. Second, as described in Table 3, the vast majority of 
organ donations occur between biologically related individuals or between spouses. One could 
imagine that although leave and tax incentives might not play a major role in the decision of 
potential donors who are biologically related to the recipient, they might have a stronger impact 
on non-related potential donors. In Table 29, we run our main regressions on the number of 
donors who are biologically related, and on the number of donors who are not biologically 
related (both including and excluding spouses). Our results indicate insignificant effects of leave 
for state employees and tax deductions for individuals. Tax credits for employers seem to have a 
negative effect on biologically related donors and a (marginally statistically significant) positive 
effect on donations from non-biologically related donors, but the point estimates are very small 
in magnitude. We also detect a negative effect of leave for private employees on donations by 
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 In unreported results, the estimated coefficients on tax credits for employers are negative and statistically 
significant, but we do not include them due to the very small sample size of the balanced panel (only 30 




non-biologically related donors, but again the estimated effect is negligible in magnitude. The 
most prevalent laws (i.e. leave for state employees and tax deductions for individuals) do not 
seem to affect biologically related and non-biologically related donors differently. Therefore, we 
find only weak evidence for the hypothesis that non-biologically related donors are more 
sensitive to the financial disincentives to donation.  
State employees as a share of the labor force. Third, we note that leave for state 
employees should only affect the incentives of state employees. We, therefore, re-run our main 
regressions controlling for the number of state employees, both total and full-time, normalized 
by the total labor force at the state-year level (to parallel the construction of the left-hand side 
variable), and interact this variable with the law indicator. These results are reported in Table 30. 
Even though the estimated interaction effects are not statistically significant, their positive sign 
and considerable magnitude suggest that perhaps the laws have some positive effect increasing 
with the size of the population affected by the law.  
 
5.2 Bone marrow donations: Main results 
As described in Section 2.2, many states have passed legislation for bone marrow donors 
that is separate from that for organ donors, but the legislation is similar in spirit. The main 
difference is that leave allowances tend to be shorter for bone marrow donors. Because the bone 
marrow donation procedure is less costly to the donor relative to organ donation (in terms of risk 
of complications, pain and suffering, recovery time, and the possibility of future donation), such 




donors than they do for organ donors.
46
 In addition, two methods of donation exist—apheresis 
and aspiration, with the former being a much less invasive procedure. 
The results are presented in Tables 31 through 33. Once again, in our most stringent 
specification (including year and state fixed effects and state time trends) we find no evidence 
that leave or tax legislation had any impact on the number of bone marrow donations 
(normalized by one million population). Given the evidence discussed in Section 4, including 
time trends is particularly relevant here. 
If we break down donations by gender (Table 32), we again find no effect from such 
laws. In Table 33C, we split our regressions between donations by apheresis versus donations by 
aspiration. Apheresis as a form of donation first appears in our data in 1999, so we run our 
regressions using just the observations for those individuals donating after 1999. Although 
apheresis is significantly less burdensome for the donor, some authors still consider bone marrow 
donation via aspiration preferable (Seitz et al., 2012.) Yet, because the financial and physical 
barriers to apheresis are lower than for aspiration, one might expect an increase in this type of 
donation, in particular from donors on the margin between donating and not donating. On the 
other hand, the introduction of leave and tax deductions for donation may allow donors to choose 
the more burdensome option of aspiration, which would not have been feasible without the leave 
laws and tax deductions to cover incidental expenses associated with donation. Only leave for 
private employees appears to have a marginally significant effect on the method of donation; it 
reduces donation by aspiration. This negative coefficient may be somewhat counterbalanced by 
the positive (but insignificant) coefficient for apheresis donations. It appears that although these 
laws have no effect on overall donations, they may have some effect on how individuals chose to 
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donate. The other laws also yield opposite signed coefficients, although in favor of more “costly” 
aspiration. Again the estimates are not statistically significant. 
 
5.2b Bone marrow donations: Additional analyses 
Balanced Panel. As with organs, we also consider the possibility that the main effect of 
these laws will occur shortly after their passage. Again, we take observations from five years 
before and five years after the passage of a law, omitting the year of passage, to determine if a 
more immediate, and perhaps less long-term, effect exists.
47
 Again, we find no effect from these 
types of legislation on the number of bone marrow donations.  
State employees as a share of the labor force. We also re-run our analysis controlling 
for the number of state employees, both total and full time, normalized by the state labor force to 
parallel the way we constructed the left-hand side variable. The results are reported in Table 34. 
Unlike with organs, this analysis does indicate a positive and significant effect from leave for 
state employees on bone marrow donations. In fact, although the main effect of leave for state 
employees is negative and usually insignificant, we find that the interaction between the rate of 
employment by the state and the existence of leave for state employees is positive and 
significant. The coefficient estimates of about -1.5 on leave for state employees and of 37.2 on 
the interaction term imply that leave for state employees has a positive effect if state employees 
represent at least 4.1 percent of the labor force, which is true for almost 48 percent of state-year 
observations in the data. Using just full-time employees (which account for 72% of state 
employees) yields similar results: the effect of leave legislation on bone marrow donations is 
positive if full-time state employees are at least 1.8 percent of the state labor force, which holds 
for 98% of state-year observations in our sample. 
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5.3 Effect on the quality of organs 
Although we found no effect of these types of legislation on the quantity of organ 
donation, we explore the possibility that these laws could have shifted the quality composition of 
organs used for transplant. One way this could happen is if the legislation has opposed effects on 
different types of living donors. For example, the laws might have led to increased donations 
among less intrinsically motivated donors and decreased them among the more intrinsically 
motivated and the latter are donors of higher “quality,” on average (Titmuss, 1971).
48
 Another 
possibility is that the laws are affecting living and deceased donations differently. Fernandez et 
al. (2012) measure a substitution effect between live and cadaveric donors. A shift in the 
distribution of donors between living and cadaveric could also lead to a shift in the quality 
distribution if those two donor sources lead to systematically different survival outcomes. Both 
medical and social factors could lead to differences in the outcomes yielded by these two donor 
sources. Although living donors do tend to be older and, therefore, less likely to yield high-
quality organs, the timing of donation can be optimized with living donors. The timing is 
important since the organ rapidly deteriorates without a blood supply and because this ensures 
that the recipient and donor are in the best health possible at the time of transplantation rather 
than allowing the timing of the transplant to be entirely determined by the time of death of the 
donor. Regarding social factors, living donation may proxy for a better social support network, 
which could improve longer term survival.
49
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 Note that the opposite could also happen, with the more intrinsically motivated donors being lower-quality donors 
(Healy, 2006). If these donors have lower motivation to give in the presence of incentives, the quality of the 
resulting pool of organs will actually increase. 
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 In a study of 289 transplant centers, the lack of a support person available to the transplant recipient was viewed 
as an absolute contraindication to transplantation by 6.5% and 2.6% of kidney and liver transplant centers, 
respectively. The relative contraindication percentages are 67.4% and 33.5% for kidneys and livers, respectively 




We consider, as a measure of the quality of the organ transplanted, the total number of 
grafts functioning for at least six months (or for three years in some regressions) as a share of the 
total number of transplants. In all of our regressions, we include a range of match, donor, and 
recipient characteristics that could affect survival as specified in Table 35.
50
 Because survival 
data on bone marrow transplants are not available, we must limit the following analysis to just 
organ donations. Re-running the main regressions for this time period does not change the null 
effect of these types of legislation on the donor supply. Table 36 shows descriptive statistics for 
the quality outcome variables. Obviously, longer time periods are associated with higher death 
rates. Also, it appears that survival for recipients of living donations is higher than for recipients 
of cadaveric donors.  
The regression results (from a linear probability model) are shown in Tables 37 through 
40. Overall, we find no effect of these laws on the quality of the organs donated as measured by 
the six-month state-level survival rate. When we consider the three-year survival period, 
however, we find some marginally significant evidence of a positive effect from leave for state 
employees. Since the pattern of coefficients is similar for six-months and three-years, and 
because significant factors external to transplantation can affect longer term survival, we focus 
predominantly on the six-month survival rates as the more accurate measure of quality. 
We do find statistically significant differences among some subpopulations, which may 
indicate a shift in the distribution of organs used, even if overall we find no quality impact. In 
Table 38 we look at survival rates of recipients of female and male organs separately, further 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
networks on post-transplant survival among liver and kidney recipients, authors have documented its importance in 
heart transplantation (Bohachick et al., 2002) and long-term dialysis outcomes (Thong et al., 2007). A review of 122 
studies across medical fields suggests that social support is important for patient adherence to medical treatment 
(DiMatteo, 2004). 
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 The controls used mirror those used by the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients to calculate transplant-




distinguishing between live and cadaveric organs. Leave for private employees increases the 
survival rate for recipients of live male organs by 5.5 percentage points (for comparison, the 
average six-month survival rate is 86 percent), whereas tax deductions for individuals increases 
the live female donor survival rate by almost 7 percentage points (compared to an average of 92 
percent). The latter effect seems to be offset by a negative, marginally significant effect on 
recipients of live male organs. 
Finally, we look at kidneys (Table 39) and livers (Table 40) separately. We find little or 
no effects for kidneys or livers when analyzed separately for six-month survival. For three-year 
survival rates, we find some marginally significant positive effects from leave for state 
employees and individual tax deductions for liver transplant recipients, which parallel in sign the 
coefficients for six-month survival. Leave for state employees leads to a 3.1 percentage point 
increase, and tax deductions for individuals leads to a 7.3 percentage point increase in the three-
year survival rate of liver transplant recipients. The average survival rate among this population 
is 56 percent.  
Overall, there is some evidence of a positive effect of leave for state employees on three-
year survival rates, although the estimates are only marginally significant. Slightly stronger 
evidence of some positive effects on quality of leave for private employees and individual tax 
deductions also exists. Thus, the legislation might be inducing quality improvements in survival 





6. Discussion and conclusions  
Policymakers and scholars have long debated how to overcome the shortage of organs 




the supply is insufficient to cover the need, and legal rules and social norms prevent direct 
compensation. We analyzed a third option, tax and leave laws, which allow donors of organs or 
bone marrow to be, at least financially, not significantly worse off than before donating. 
Donating an organ is a costly decision for the living donor, and one that may hinge on financial 
(and work-related) considerations. Because of these costs, the efficacy of these laws is certainly 
not guaranteed. Donating bone marrow is also not likely a decision that is made lightly, but it is 
less burdensome. On this basis, if incentives have a positive impact on donation, we anticipated 
that the incentives examined would have a stronger effect on bone marrow than on organs. 
Our results are consistent with this interpretation; we documented no impact of the 
legislation on the number of organ donations, and a positive impact on bone marrow donations. 
We also found some marginally significant evidence of a positive effect of the legislation on 
organ quality. This suggests that only focusing on changes in quantity may overlook shifts in the 
underlying quality distribution of organs used for transplantation. 
A few explanations could exist for the lack of an effect of the legislation on the quantity 
of organs. First, it is possible that not enough people are aware of the existence of the legislation. 
UNOS, for example, does not mention these types of legislation in its summary of information 
for prospective living organ donors.
51
 (The NMDP does, however, mention the existence of laws 
providing leave to donors, which also could help explain the stronger effect of these types of 
legislation on bone marrow donations.
52
) Second, the results could be confounded by the 
existence of grant programs, which already may be providing the same cost reimbursement as 
the tax laws. Employer-specific paid leave programs could further be diminishing the effect of 










 Third, a composition effect might be occurring, whereby some subsets of the 
population are positively motivated by these additional incentives to donate (on top of their 
intrinsic motives) whereas others are “crowded out” (because their self or social image may be 
tainted [Benabou and Tirole, 2006] or because they consider the presence of material incentives 
repugnant [Roth, 2007]). Fourth, the incentives put in place by these types of legislation might 
not be strong enough to induce an individual, who is not otherwise sufficiently altruistically 
motivated, to endure the pain, suffering, scarring, time away from work and leisure, and 
undocumented long-term donor health effects implied by an organ donation. Some evidence also 
exists that donors occasionally have difficulty obtaining life and health insurance post-donation 
(Rudow et al., 2006; Spital and Jacobs, 2002).
54
 Untangling these explanations is of importance 
for policymakers interested in increasing and enhancing the supply of organs for transplantation.  
The positive effect of the legislation on bone marrow donations leads us to favor the 
fourth explanation: although tax breaks and leave provisions may be sufficient to induce, at the 
margin, individuals to undergo a moderately invasive procedure such as a bone marrow 
donation, they may be too low for the more "costly" organ donations. Similarly, there may be 
enough individuals at the margin between being willing to donate bone marrow or not, such that 
the incentives analyzed here tip their decision, but this may not be the case for organs. In other 
words, and following the terminology of Gneezy and Rustichini (2000), the incentives described 
here may be “large enough” for bone marrow donations, but not for organ donations. The 
                                                          
53
 For the particularly financially constrained, organizations such as The National Living Donor Assistance Center 
(www.livingdonorassistance.org) provide grants to cover the costs of donation, which may leave the legislation with 
little room to have an impact. In addition, the American Society of Transplantation publishes an incomplete list of 
the names of private companies, including large organizations such as major state universities (Iowa, Minnesota, 
Ohio, and Wisconsin) offering paid leave to donate to their employees. Such initiatives could be obscuring the 
effects of legislation mandating unpaid leave. 
54
 Perhaps suggestive of the issues with insuring organ donors, The Living Organ Donor Protection Act, which 





findings from Lacetera and Macis (2012) and Lacetera, Macis and Slonim (2011, 2012) of a 
positive effect of leave legislation and $5-$15 gift cards on an even less invasive procedure, 
blood donation, further corroborate our interpretation.  
If this interpretation is correct, then we would expect larger incentives to have positive 
effects on bone marrow donations, and potentially also on organ donations. More systematic 
analyses from contexts where such stronger incentives are provided would be needed to reach 
firmer conclusions, however. The recent decision on December 1, 2011 by the 9th U.S. Circuit 
Court of Appeals that bone marrow apheresis can be compensated will provide researchers with 
an opportunity to further our understanding of which policies are effective in reducing the organ 
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The apheresis technique did not exist at the time of the National Organ Transplant Act in 1984 (Korbling and 
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Figure 8: Total donations by type of donation 
 
 
Notes: OPTN data through 12/31/2008; NMDP data through 12/31/2008. 
 
 
Figure 9: Total donations by type of donor 
 
 

























Table 19: State laws for organ donors 
State 
Leave for state 
employees 
Leave for private 
employees 
Tax deduction for 
individuals* 
Tax credit for 
employers 
Alaska 2008 
   Arkansas 2003 2005 2005 2005 
California 2002 
   Colorado 1989 
   Connecticut 2007 2004 
  Delaware 2001 
   Georgia 2002 
 
2004 
 Hawaii 2005 
   Idaho 2006 
 
2006 
 Illinois 2002 2005 
  Indiana 2002 
   Iowa 2003 
 
2005 
 Kansas 2001 
   Louisiana 
  
2005 
 Maine 2002 2002 
  Maryland 2000 
   Massachusetts 2005 
   Minnesota 2006 
 
2005 
 Mississippi 2004 2004 2006 
 Missouri 2001 
   New Mexico 2007 
 
2005 
 New York 2001 
 
2006 
 North Carolina 
    North Dakota 2005 
 
2005 
 Ohio 2001 
 
2007 














 South Carolina 2002 2006 
  Texas 2003 
   Utah 2002 
 
2005 
 Virginia  2001 
 
2007 
 Washington 2002 
   West Virginia 2005 
   Wisconsin 2000   2004   
*Idaho has an individual tax credit rather than tax deduction. 






Table 20: State laws for bone marrow donors 
State 
Leave for state 
employees 




Tax credit for 
employers 
Alaska 2008 
   Arkansas 2003 2005 2005 2005 
California 2002 
   Colorado 1989 
   Connecticut 2004 2004 
  Delaware 2001 
   Georgia 2002 
 
2004 
 Hawaii 2005 
   Idaho 2006 
 
2006 
 Illinois 2002 2005 
  Indiana 2002 
   Iowa 2003 
 
2005 
 Kansas 2001 




   Massachusetts 2005 
   Minnesota 1990 2004 2005 
 Mississippi 2004 2004 2006 
 Missouri 2001 
   Nebraska 1992 1992 
  New Mexico 2007 
 
2005 
 New York 2001 2007 2006 
 North Dakota 2005 
 
2005 
 Ohio 2001 
 
2007 
 Oklahoma 2002 
 
2008 











 South Carolina 2002 2002 
  Texas 2003 
   Utah 2002 
 
2005 
 Virginia  2001 
 
1997 
 Washington 2002 
   West Virginia 2005 
   Wisconsin 2000   2004   
*Idaho has an individual tax credit rather than tax deduction. 










deviation Minimum Maximum 
Total 1071 66.8 19.7 0.0 157.5 
Live 1071 16.8 8.4 0.0 59.2 
Cadaveric 1071 50.0 15.3 0.0 126.3 
Male  1071 37.6 11.9 0.0 88.1 
Female 1071 29.2 10.2 0.0 76.9 
Livers 1069 16.1 6.2 0.9 48.5 
Kidneys 1071 46.7 12.5 13.0 99.4 
Live - male 1071 7.1 3.9 0.0 32.7 
Dead - male 1071 30.5 10.4 0.0 78.1 
Live - female 1071 9.7 5.1 0.0 36.1 
Dead - female 1071 19.5 7.3 0.0 55.1 
Live - Livers 1069 0.6 0.9 0.0 6.9 
Dead - Livers 1069 15.5 6.0 0.9 46.7 
Live - Kidneys 1071 16.2 8.0 0.0 59.2 
Dead - Kidneys 1071 30.5 8.4 10.9 70.1 
Notes: Data are from OPTN and cover the period from 1/1/1988 through 12/31/2008. 
 
 
Table 22: Descriptive statistics – Live donor-recipient relationships 
Variable All Kidneys Livers 
Total donations 77,760 74,363 3,397 
Biological, blood-related parent 16% 15% 25% 
Biological, blood-related child 17% 17% 25% 
Biological, blood-related identical twin 0% 0% 0% 
Biological, blood-related sibling 31% 32% 15% 
Biological, blood-related half-sibling 1% 1% 1% 
Biological, blood-related other relative 7% 7% 10% 
Non-biological, spouse 10% 11% 6% 
Non-biological, life partner 0% 0% 0% 
Non-biological, unrelated: paired exchange 1% 1% 0% 
Non-biological, unrelated: anonymous donation 1% 1% 1% 
Non-biological, living/deceased donor exchange 0% 0% 0% 
Non-biological, unrelated: domino 0% 0% 2% 
Non-biological, other directed donation 15% 15% 16% 





Table 23: Descriptive statistics – Bone marrow 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Bone marrow transplants per 1m population 
Total 1173 3.7 3.3 0.0 21.3 
Female 1173 1.6 1.7 0.0 13.7 
Male  1173 2.1 2.0 0.0 15.2 
% of donation requests resulting in donation 
Total 1173 61% 27% 0% 100% 
Female 1173 48% 32% 0% 100% 
Male  1173 51% 31% 0% 100% 
Apheresis versus aspiration per 1m population 
Apheresis  1049 2.4 3.4 0.0 22.7 
Aspiration 1049 3.8 3.0 0.0 33.0 
% of donations requests resulting in X type of donation 
Apheresis  1049 28% 32% 0% 100% 
Aspiration 1049 72% 32% 0% 100% 





Table 24: Descriptive statistics – Waitlist 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum 
Cumulative waitlist per 1m population 1020 480 352 4 1711 
Cumulative waitlist per 1m population 
minus cumulative removals from waitlist 
per 1m population 1020 64 53 0 308 
Cumulative candidates dying on waitlist or 
deteriorating until too sick for transplant per 
1m population 1020 35 36 0 170 
Yearly number of candidates dying on 
waitlist or deteriorating until too sick for 
transplant per 1m population 1016 5 4 0 21 







Table 25: Probability of legislation passing 
 
(Outcome = probability of law passing) 















     Cumulative waitlist per 1m population -0.0149 0.0106 -0.00769 -0.0113 
  (0.0242) (0.0102) (0.0154) (0.0109) 
Observations 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 
R-squared 0.120 0.125 0.147 0.149 
     Cumulative waitlist per 1m population minus 
cumulative removals from waitlist per 1m 
population since October 1987 0.0741 -0.0518 0.0882* 0.000502 
  (0.0961) (0.0396) (0.0525) (0.0329) 
Observations 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 
R-squared 0.120 0.125 0.148 0.148 
     Cumulative candidates dying on waitlist or 
deteriorating until too sick for transplant per 1m 
population -0.170 0.0438* -0.0311 -0.0152 
  (0.123) (0.0238) (0.0724) (0.0340) 
Observations 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 
R-squared 0.121 0.125 0.147 0.148 
Yearly number of candidates dying on waitlist or 
deteriorating until too sick for transplant per 1m 
population -0.226 0.0362 0.253 -0.0990 
  (0.289) (0.131) (0.161) (0.0956) 
Observations 1,016 1,016 1,016 1,016 
R-squared 0.120 0.124 0.148 0.149 
Notes: The data include the full unbalanced panel. State-level controls include unemployment rate and 
income per capita. All regressions include state and year fixed effects and state time trends. State-level 







Table 26: Organs -- Main results 
(Outcome = organ transplants per one million population) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Type of donations All All All All All Cadaveric Live 
Leave for state employees 11.46*** -1.041 6.003*** -0.236 -1.204 -1.566 0.362 
 
(3.731) (2.848) (2.178) (1.762) (2.293) (2.061) (1.008) 
Leave for private employees 10.91* 2.665 11.15* 6.466 4.428 5.357 -0.927 
 
(5.782) (5.610) (5.702) (4.608) (6.333) (6.327) (1.303) 
Tax credits for employers 5.502 -3.641 -7.104 -4.188 -2.418 -1.655 -0.763 
 
(4.861) (4.442) (6.848) (5.106) (6.823) (7.497) (1.172) 
Tax deductions for individuals 8.139 1.153 -0.578 0.240 -1.419 -0.0303 -1.387 
  (4.998) (3.670) (4.006) (2.419) (3.761) (3.452) (1.292) 




X X X X 
State fixed effects 
  
X X X X X 
State-year fixed effects       X X X 
Observations 1,071 1,071 1,071 1,071 1,071 1,071 1,071 
R-squared 0.160 0.458 0.562 0.693 0.734 0.624 0.830 
Notes: The data include the full unbalanced panel. State-level controls include unemployment rate and 




Table 27: Organs -- Results by gender 
(Outcome = organ transplants per one million population) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 









Leave for state employees -1.479 -1.874 0.395 0.275 0.308 -0.0331 
 
(1.425) (1.302) (0.460) (1.228) (1.210) (0.652) 
Leave for private employees 4.260 5.214 -0.952 0.167 0.143 0.0252 
 
(3.961) (3.950) (0.839) (3.322) (3.161) (0.839) 
Tax credits for employers -1.666 -2.475 0.809 -0.752 0.820 -1.572 
 
(3.197) (3.886) (1.166) (4.152) (3.955) (1.068) 
Tax deductions for individuals -0.0578 0.244 -0.301 -1.361 -0.274 -1.086 
  (2.395) (2.291) (0.663) (1.738) (1.615) (0.756) 
Observations 1,071 1,071 1,071 1,071 1,071 1,071 
R-squared 0.615 0.552 0.725 0.673 0.481 0.766 
Notes: The data include the full unbalanced panel. State-level controls include unemployment rate and 
income per capita. All regressions include state and year fixed effects and state time trends. State-level 





Table 28: Organs -- Results for livers and kidneys separately 
(Outcome = organ transplants per one million population) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 









Leave for state employees -0.342 0.0362 -0.378 -0.979 0.295 -1.276 
 
(0.730) (0.165) (0.736) (1.633) (1.051) (1.280) 
Leave for private employees 1.780 -0.479** 2.259 2.124 -0.509 2.635 
 
(2.530) (0.230) (2.515) (3.620) (1.319) (3.538) 
Tax credits for employers -0.403 0.804 -1.207 -2.213 -1.527 -0.687 
 
(3.035) (0.545) (3.421) (3.487) (1.255) (4.049) 
Tax deductions for individuals -0.0744 0.315 -0.389 -0.494 -1.692 1.200 
  (1.217) (0.298) (1.184) (2.307) (1.370) (1.956) 
Observations 1,069 1,069 1,069 1,071 1,071 1,071 
R-squared 0.735 0.575 0.722 0.704 0.814 0.523 
Notes: The data include the full unbalanced panel. State-level controls include unemployment rate and 
income per capita. All regressions include state and year fixed effects and state time trends. State-level 
clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1 
 
 
Table 29: Organs -- Results by donor-recipient relationship 
(Outcome = organ transplants per one million population) 












Leave for state employees 0.000365 0.00414 0.0142 
 
(0.0137) (0.0156) (0.0163) 
Leave for private employees 0.0117 -0.0281** -0.0263* 
 
(0.0142) (0.0106) (0.0141) 
Tax credits for employers -0.0453** 0.0266* 0.0233 
 
(0.0214) (0.0134) (0.0223) 
Tax deductions for individuals 0.00499 -0.0122 -0.00161 
  (0.0147) (0.0124) (0.0111) 
Observations 1,070 1,070 1,070 
R-squared 0.978 0.621 0.468 
Notes: The data include the full unbalanced panel. State-level controls include unemployment rate and 
income per capita. All regressions include state and year fixed effects and state time trends. State-level 




Table 30: Organs – Results controlling for and interacting with state 
employment rate 
(Outcome = organ transplants per one million population) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Type of donor All All Live Live Cadaveric Cadaveric 
Leave for state employees -6.211 -8.371 1.469 1.019 -7.682 -9.392 
 
(6.432) (6.309) (3.328) (2.909) (5.622) (5.825) 
Leave for private employees 1.377 1.810 -0.686 -0.586 2.063 2.396 
 
(8.737) (8.840) (1.833) (1.869) (8.018) (8.132) 
Tax credits for employers 2.444 2.011 -0.341 -0.467 2.785 2.478 
 
(14.05) (13.87) (1.852) (1.876) (13.91) (13.73) 
Tax deductions for individuals -1.012 -0.982 -1.552 -1.581 0.540 0.599 
 
(4.103) (4.211) (1.435) (1.462) (3.786) (3.856) 











Leave for state employees* 


























Leave for state employees * 













       Observations 784 784 784 784 784 784 
R-squared 0.716 0.717 0.812 0.812 0.654 0.655 
Notes: The data include the full unbalanced panel. State-level controls include unemployment rate and 
income per capita. All regressions include state and year fixed effects and state time trends. State-level 








Table 31: Bone marrow – Main results (donations) 
(Outcome = bone marrow donations per one million population) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Leave for state employees 1.611*** -0.585 2.370*** -0.922* 0.0788 
 
(0.345) (0.626) (0.284) (0.470) (0.397) 
Leave for private employees -0.676* -1.252** 0.321 -0.749 0.165 
 
(0.392) (0.611) (0.320) (0.509) (0.523) 
Tax credits for employers -1.288 -0.538 0.0487 -0.115 0.869 
 
(0.800) (0.951) (0.884) (0.650) (0.825) 
Tax deductions for individuals 0.222 -1.233* 0.166 -1.066** -0.313 
  (0.377) (0.630) (0.378) (0.431) (0.441) 





State fixed effects 
  
X X X 
State-level time trends 
    
X 
Observations 1,173 1,173 1,173 1,173 1,173 
R-squared 0.038 0.380 0.356 0.650 0.780 
Notes: The data include the full unbalanced panel. State-level controls include unemployment rate and 




Table 32: Bone Marrow -- Donations by gender 
(Outcome = bone marrow donations per one million population) 
  (1) (2) 
Type of outcome Donations - female Donations - male 
Leave for state employees 0.126 -0.0474 
 
(0.248) (0.193) 
Leave for private employees 0.201 -0.0358 
 
(0.268) (0.302) 
Tax credits for employers -0.210 -0.103 
 
(0.277) (0.247) 
Tax deductions for individuals 0.116 0.752 
  (0.390) (0.460) 
Observations 1,173 1,173 
R-squared 0.615 0.715 
Notes: The data include the full unbalanced panel. All regressions include state and year fixed effects and 








Table 33: Bone marrow -- Donations by method 
(Outcome = bone marrow donations per one million population) 
  (1) (2) 
  Apheresis donations Aspiration donations 
Leave for state employees -0.202 0.253 
 
(0.471) (0.363) 
Leave for private employees 0.634 -0.651* 
 
(0.403) (0.379) 
Tax credits for employers -0.652 0.562 
 
(0.830) (0.648) 
Tax deductions for individuals 0.879 0.387 
  (0.659) (0.568) 
Observations 507 507 
R-squared 0.844 0.788 
Notes: The data include the full unbalanced panel. All regressions include state and year fixed effects and 








Table 34: Bone marrow – Results controlling for and interacting with state 
employment rate 
(Outcome = bone marrow donations per one million population) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Type of donor All All Female Female Male Male 
Leave for state employees -1.521* -1.382* -0.929 -0.855 -0.592 -0.527 
 
(0.813) (0.749) (0.709) (0.637) (0.374) (0.358) 
Leave for private employees 0.120 0.0329 0.130 0.0741 -0.00958 -0.0412 
 
(0.512) (0.501) (0.269) (0.271) (0.300) (0.299) 
Tax credits for employers 0.866 0.898 0.129 0.148 0.737 0.750* 
 
(0.840) (0.808) (0.413) (0.393) (0.454) (0.443) 
Tax deductions for individuals -0.235 -0.197 -0.224 -0.197 -0.0118 -0.000537 
 
(0.413) (0.399) (0.263) (0.250) (0.233) (0.231) 











Leave for state employees* 


























Leave for state employees * 













       Observations 1,122 1,122 1,122 1,122 1,122 1,122 
R-squared 0.789 0.789 0.626 0.626 0.727 0.727 
Notes: Includes the full unbalanced panel. State-level controls include unemployment rate and income per 
capita. All regressions include state and year fixed effects and state-level time trends. State-level clustered 










Table 35: Descriptive statistics – Donor, match, and patient characteristics 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
% incompatible recipient-donor blood types 1071 14% 12% 0% 68% 
% pediatric patients (<18 years) 1071 8% 3% 0% 30% 
% multi-organ recipients 1071 2% 2% 0% 15% 
% with diabetes diagnosis 1071 16% 5% 0% 38% 
% with non-cholestatic liver disease 1067 55% 12% 0% 100% 
Cold ischemia time 1071 13 3 6 26 
Recipient age 1071 44 4 32 55 
Days on waitlist 1071 395 132 55 907 
Notes: These percentages and averages are calculated for the whole sample. Subsample rates are used in 
subsample analyses.  
 
 
Table 36: Descriptive statistics – Quality outcome variables 





% survive six months - all donor types 1071 86% 7% 36% 100% 
% survive three years - all donor types 1071 62% 24% 0% 100% 
% survive six months - live donors 1068 93% 8% 0% 100% 
% survive six months - cadaveric donors 1071 84% 7% 41% 100% 
% survive six months - female donors 1071 86% 8% 33% 100% 
% survive six months - male donors 1071 86% 8% 17% 100% 
% survive six months - live female donors 1062 92% 9% 0% 100% 
% survive six months - cadaveric female 
donors 1069 83% 11% 0% 100% 
% survive six months - live male donors 1056 93% 10% 0% 100% 
% survive six months - cadaveric male 
donors 1070 85% 8% 0% 100% 
% survive six months - kidney donors 1071 89% 7% 40% 100% 
% survive three years - kidney donors 1071 65% 25% 0% 100% 
% survive six months - live kidney donors 1068 93% 8% 0% 100% 
% survive six months - cadaveric kidney 
donors 1071 87% 7% 43% 100% 
% survive six months - liver donors 1067 78% 12% 0% 100% 
% survive three years - liver donors 1067 56% 24% 0% 100% 
% survive six months - live liver donors 579 80% 30% 0% 100% 
% survive six months - cadaveric liver 






Table 37: Tax and leave effects on quality – All organs 
 (Outcome = state-level survival rate) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Survival time Six months Three years Six months Six months 
Type of donor All All Live Cadaveric 
Leave for state employees 0.198 1.509* 0.444 -0.0627 
 
(0.506) (0.761) (0.794) (0.614) 
Leave for private employees -0.0366 -1.042 0.402 0.323 
 
(0.838) (1.187) (1.387) (1.474) 
Tax credits for employers 0.220 2.182 1.127 0.262 
 
(0.690) (1.733) (1.012) (0.874) 
Tax deductions for individuals 0.827 1.561 2.985 0.579 
  (0.953) (1.025) (2.536) (1.395) 
Observations 1,067 965 579 1,067 
R-squared 0.723 0.887 0.556 0.676 
Notes: The data include the full unbalanced panel. All survival rates are multiplied by 100 so the 
coefficients can be read as percentage changes. All regressions include state and year fixed effects and 
state-level time trends. Case mix controls: recipient age, recipient gender, diagnosis = noncholestatic v. 
other (livers), diagnosis=diabetes v. other (kidneys), live donor, and pediatric recipient. State-level 
clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1 
 
Table 38: Tax and leave effects on quality - Organs by gender 
(Outcome = state-level six-month survival rate) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 









Leave for state employees 1.172* -0.629 -0.148 0.648 1.407 -1.031 
 
(0.599) (0.807) (1.411) (0.843) (0.973) (0.869) 
Leave for private employees -0.648 0.983 -1.106 5.516** -0.487 1.062 
 
(1.138) (1.220) (2.656) (2.118) (1.863) (1.862) 
Tax credits for employers 0.649 0.0985 1.109 -0.136 1.012 -0.0194 
 
(1.019) (0.802) (2.030) (1.243) (1.199) (0.920) 
Tax deductions for individuals -1.067 1.495 6.924** -4.020* -1.847 2.045 
  (1.129) (1.534) (3.112) (2.154) (2.218) (2.384) 
Observations 1,055 1,064 449 442 1,055 1,064 
R-squared 0.563 0.583 0.579 0.613 0.465 0.540 
Notes: The data include the full unbalanced panel. All survival rates are multiplied by 100 so the 
coefficients can be read as percentage changes. All regressions include state and year fixed effects and 
state-level time trends. Case mix controls: recipient age, recipient gender, diagnosis = noncholestatic vs. 
other (livers), diagnosis=diabetes v. other (kidneys), live donor, and pediatric recipient. State-level 





Table 39: Tax and leave effects on quality - Kidneys 
(Outcome = state-level survival rate) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Survival time Six months Three years Six months Six months 
Type of donor All All Live  Cadaveric 
Leave for state employees -0.121 0.726 0.872 -0.516 
 
(0.478) (0.786) (0.955) (0.657) 
Leave for private employees -0.0557 -0.780 0.847 -0.590 
 
(0.950) (1.647) (1.214) (1.371) 
Tax credits for employers -0.417 2.247 -0.366 -0.615 
 
(0.625) (1.875) (1.006) (1.109) 
Tax deductions for individuals -0.429 -0.918 -0.140 -0.631 
  (0.943) (1.543) (1.496) (1.073) 
Observations 1,071 969 1,021 1,071 
R-squared 0.663 0.855 0.356 0.592 
Notes: The data include the full unbalanced panel. All survival rates are multiplied by 100 so the 
coefficients can be read as percentage changes. All regressions include state and year fixed effects and 
state-level time trends. Case mix controls: recipient age, recipient gender, diagnosis = noncholestatic v. 
other (livers), diagnosis=diabetes v. other (kidneys), live donor, and pediatric recipient. State-level 
clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1 
 
 
Table 40: Tax and leave effects on quality - Livers 
(Outcome = state-level survival rate) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Survival time Six months Three years Six months Six months 
Type of donor All All Live  Cadaveric 
Leave for state employees 1.502 3.089* -1.339 1.382 
 
(1.266) (1.689) (4.603) (1.294) 
Leave for private employees 0.895 -1.320 -8.292 1.758 
 
(2.223) (3.928) (13.57) (2.411) 
Tax credits for employers 1.910 0.236 -4.518 2.005 
 
(1.426) (3.106) (10.44) (1.401) 
Tax deductions for individuals 3.092 7.318* 1.747 1.639 
  (3.556) (3.981) (21.92) (3.992) 
Observations 1,067 963 490 1,067 
R-squared 0.534 0.652 0.428 0.527 
Notes: The data include the full unbalanced panel. All survival rates are multiplied by 100 so the 
coefficients can be read as percentage changes. All regressions include state and year fixed effects and 
state-level time trends. Case mix controls: recipient age, recipient gender, diagnosis = noncholestatic v. 
other (livers), diagnosis=diabetes v. other (kidneys), live donor, and pediatric recipient. State-level 




Table 41: Legal references 
State References 
Alaska HB 252 
Arkansas A.C.A. § 11-3-205; HB 2779; A.C.A. §21-4-215; HB 1393 
California  Cal Ed Code §89519.5; Cal Lab Code §1510 
Colorado CRS 24-50-104; HB 1250 
Connecticut SB 1447; Conn Gen Stat § 17b-288; SB 327 
Delaware 14 Del. C § 1318B; 29 Del. C. § 5122;  
Georgia OCGA § 47-7-27; OCGA § 45-20-31 
Hawaii HRS §78-23.6 
Idaho Idaho Code §59-1608; Idaho Code §63-3029K; Idaho Code §67-5343 
Illinois HB0324 
Indiana 2002 Ind. PL 94 
Iowa Iowa Code §422.7; Iowa Code §70A.39 
Kansas Exec Order No. 2001-02 
Louisiana La RS 47:297; La RS 47:287.758; 1992 HB 428 
Maine 26 MRSA §843 
Maryland Md State Personnel and Pensions Code Ann §9-1106 
Massachusetts ALM GL ch 62, §3; 2005 Acts Chapter 99 §1.33E 
Minnesota Minn Stat §181.945; Minn Stat §181.9456; S.F. No. 2840 
Mississippi Miss. S.B. 2981; Miss Code Ann §27-7-18; Miss Code Ann §25-3-103 
Missouri HB 679 (2001) 
Nebraska RRS Neb §71-4820; 1992 Neb LB 1099 
New Mexico NM Stat Ann §24-28-3; NM Stat Ann §7-2-36 
New York NY CLS Labor §202-b; NY CLS Tax §612 
North Dakota SB 2298, Ch 476; ND Cent Code §57-38-30.3 
Ohio ORC Ann 5747.01; ORC 124.139 
Oklahoma 68 Okl St §2358; 74 Okl St §840-2.20B  
Oregon ORS §659A.312; ORS §315.604 
Pennsylvania 35 PS §6120.2; 35 PS §6120.3 
Rhode Island 2009 RI SB 76 
South Carolina S.C. Code §8-11-65; S.C. R. 61; 2005 SC R 373; 1992 S.C. R. 642 
Texas Tex Govt Code §661.916 
Utah Utah Code Ann §59-10-1015; Utah Code Ann 1953 §67-19-14.5; 2002 Ut. SB 125 
Virginia  Va Code Ann §2.2-2821.1; Va Code Ann §58.1-322 
Washington Exec Order 02-01 
West Virginia W.Va Code §29-6-28 
Wisconsin 2003 AB 477; Wis Stat §71.05; Wis. Stat §230.35 
 
 
 
